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I. INTRODUCTION
[I ask you] to make today ... a date whose meaning you will proudly
teach your children. . . . We are proud of having struggled amid
tears, fire, and blood [for it was] an indispensable struggle if we
were to put an end to the humiliating slavery that had been forced
upon us. . . . We are going to begin another struggle together, my
@ 2010. Professor of Law, Georgia State University College of Law. I am indebted
to the many legal scholars who have critiqued the decolonization process, including Antony
Anghie, Ibrahim Gassama, James Thuo Gathii, Ruth Gordon, Tayyab Mahmud, and Henry
J. Richardson III, and grateful to the Georgia State University College of Law for its re-
search support. The arguments presented in this essay are addressed in more detail in
NATSU TAYLOR SAITO, MEETING THE ENEMY: AMERICAN EXCEPTIONALISM AND INTERNATIONAL
LAw (2010).
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brothers, my sisters, a sublime struggle that will bring our country
peace, prosperity, and grandeur.
Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba,
Congo Independence Day, June 30, 19601
The national liberation movements of the late 1950s and 1960s
brought tremendous hope and renewed aspirations to colonized peoples
around the world, as illustrated by Patrice Lumumba's speech upon
the recognition of the independence of the Congo.2 The UN played a
significant role in the decolonization process,3 but neither that body
nor the colonial powers liberated "dependent" territories; independence
was hard won by colonized peoples, and reluctantly acknowledged by
their colonizers. 4 As Argentine journalist Adolfo Gilly observed in his
1965 introduction to political philosopher Frantz Fanon's Studies in a
Dying Colonialism: "The whole of humanity has erupted violently, tu-
multuously onto the state of history, taking its own destiny in its
hands. . . . Liberation does not come as a gift from anybody."5 The
"tears, fire, and blood" were a price worth paying to bequeath genuine
self-determination to coming generations.
In 1957, under Kwame Nkrumah's leadership, Ghana became
the first African colony to win its independence. 6 A few years later,
referencing Africa's vast mineral, agricultural and hydrological re-
sources, Nkrumah emphasized: "Never before have a people had within
their grasp so great an opportunity for developing a continent endowed
with so much wealth."7 Besides political independence, Nkrumah said,
"[a]ll we ask of the former colonial powers is their good will and co-
1. Patrice Lumumba, "Speech at Proclamation of Independence," June 30, 1960, in
INDEPENDENCE DOCUMENTS OF THE WORLD 793-797 (Albert P. Blaustein, Jay A. Sigler &
Benjamin R. Beede eds. 1977) The precise wording of Lumumba's speech is reported in
various ways, perhaps because it was a somewhat impromptu response to insulting
comments made by Belgian King Albert Baudouin at the ceremony. See DAVID RENTON,
DAVID SEDDON & LEO ZEILIG, THE CONGO: PLUNDER AND RESISTANCE 80-81 (2007)
(alteration in original).
2. On Lumumba's assassination soon thereafter, see Ibrahim J. Gassama, Africa and
the Politics of Destruction: A Critical Re-Examination of Neocolonialism and its
Consequences, 10 ORE. REV. INT'L L. 327, 328-332 (2008).
3. See ANTONY ANGHIE, IMPERIALISM, SOVEREIGNTY AND THE MAKING OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW 196 (2005).
4. See Alain Pellet, Book Review of the Charter of the United Nations: A Commentary,
ed. Bruno Simma, 25 MICH. J. INT'L L. 135, 140-141 (2003).
5. Adolfo Gilly, Introduction in FRANTz FANON, STUDIES IN A DYING COLONIALISM 1-2
(1965).
6. See JAMES H. MERIWETHER, PROUDLY WE CAN BE AFRICANS: BLACK AMERICANS AND
AFRICA, 1935-1961 150 (2002).
7. Kwame Nkrumah, I Speak of Freedom, 1961, available at http://www.fordham.edu/
halsall/mod/1961nkrumah.html. See generally Gassama, supra note 2 (discussing the
impact of Nkrumah's subsequent analysis of neocolonialism).
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operation to remedy past mistakes and injustices."8 The political
changes of the decades following World War II were accompanied, in
fact, by dramatic transformations of international law and legal insti-
tutions, many of them purporting to facilitate a decolonized world, but
the question remains whether past mistakes and injustices have been
addressed in any meaningful way.
At the beginning of the twentieth century only a handful of non-
European states were recognized as sufficiently "civilized" to partici-
pate in a proposed world government, a number that had grown to
about fifty by the time the United Nations (UN) was established.9 Ac-
cording to the Decolonization Unit of the United Nations, almost one-
third of the world's population was "non-self-governing" in 1945,10 but
by 2002 eighty former colonial territories had been recognized as inde-
pendent and the UN had almost two hundred members." Three
chapters of the UN Charter and one of its principal organs were de-
voted to ensuring the eventual independence of "non-self-governing
territories" and the wellbeing of their "inhabitants,"1 2 and in 1960
alone the independence of eighteen African states was acknowledged
by the United Nations. 13
More than a half-century later, it is difficult to remember the
optimism energizing the global movement for decolonization. Former
European colonies in Africa and Asia account for virtually all of the
states currently identified by the UN Development Programme
(UNDP) as "least developed." 14 According to a 2007/2008 UNDP re-
8. Nkrumah, supra note 7 (alteration in original).
9. See generally STEPHEN C. SCHLESINGER, ACT OF CREATION: THE FOUNDING OF THE
UNITED NATIONS (2003).
10. U.N. Decolonization Unit Department of Political Affairs, The United Nations and
Decolonization, available at http://www.un.org/depts/dpi/decolonization/main.htm.
11. In 1945 the UN founders anticipated some additional members, but they did not
envision a wholesale transformation of colonies or "dependencies" into "civilized states," as
illustrated by the instructions given the architects of the UN Headquarters building to
create a General Assembly hall capable of housing delegations from seventy countries, a
number far short of current UN membership. See PHYLLIS BENNIS, CALLING THE SHOTS:
How WASHINGTON DOMINATES TODAY'S UN 14-16 (1996). A listing of current UN members
is available at http://www.un.org/members/list.shtml.
12. See UN Charter, arts. 73-91 (addressing non-self-governing territories) and arts. 7-
8 (describing principal organs), available at http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/
index.shtml; see also http://www.un.org/en/mainbodies/trusteeship/ (describing purposes of
the UN Trusteeship Council).
13. See U.N. Decolonization Unit Department of Political Affairs, The United Nations
and Decolonization, Trust and Non-self-governing Territories, 1945-1999, available at http:/
/www.un.org/depts/dpi/decolonization/trust2.htm.
14. See United Nations, Development Policy and Analysis Division, List of Least
Developed Countries, available at http://www.un.org/esa/policy/devplan/profile/ldc-list.pdf.
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port, in twenty-two of these states almost two-thirds of the population
lack improved sanitation and are undernourished. 15 The UNDP's 2010
Report notes that 1.44 billion people live on less than U.S. $1.25 per
day (the World Bank's standard for extreme poverty), most of them in
South Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa. 16 UNDP studies also indicate
that fifty-four countries were poorer in 2003 than they had been a dec-
ade earlier and that overall human development, as measured by a
combination of income, life expectancy, and literacy, fell in twenty-one
countries during the 1990s. 1 7 The poorest countries are also those
most directly affected by climate change and associated "natural" di-
sasters, 18 and by the devastation associated with armed conflict.19
Beyond recognizing the independence of formerly colonized ter-
ritories, the primary "solution" proposed by the international
community for these problems has been economic development. As of
2010, the United Nations has sponsored four Development Decades,
two Industrial Development and Transport and Communications De-
cades specifically targeting Africa, two International Decades for the
Eradication of Colonialism, and two Decades for the Eradication of
Poverty.20 It is now at the midpoint of a concerted effort to reach its
"Millennium Development Goals" on the eradication of poverty.21
There are many theories about why so little of the emancipating poten-
tial of the movement for decolonization has materialized and a
multiplicity of critiques of the development programs sponsored by UN
agencies and international financial institutions. 22 Yet even as devel-
15. United Nations Development Programme, "Fighting Climate Change: Human
Solidarity in a Divided World," Human Development Report 2007/2008, at 264 (Table 10),
available at http://hdr.undp.org/en/media/HDR_10071008-EN-Complete.pdf.
16. See United Nations, Human Development Reports, 2010, available at http://
hdr.undp.org/en/reports/global/hdr20lO/summary/poverty/; see also World Bank Group,
Millennium Development Goals, available at http://ddp-ext.worldbank.org/ext/GMIS/
gdmis.do?siteld=2&goalld=5&menuld=LNAV1GOAL1 (defining extreme poverty as $1.25
per day in 2005 prices).
17. Larry Elliott, The Lost Decade, GUARDIAN, July 9, 2003.
18. Between 2000 and 2004 approximately 262 million people were impacted by
"climate disasters," with "over 98 percent of them in the developing world." See UNDP,
"Fighting Climate Change," supra note 15, at 8.
19. See The World at War: Current Conflicts, available at http://www.globalsecurity.
org/military/world/war/index.html (noting that Africa is affected by war "to a greater extent
than any other continent").
20. See United Nations Observances, International Decades, available at http://
www.un.org/observances/decades.shtml.
21. See http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/.
22. See generally Ruth E. Gordon & Jon H. Sylvester, Deconstructing Development, 22
Wis. INT'L L.J. 1 (2004); THE DEVELOPMENT DICTIONARY: A GUIDE TO KNOWLEDGE AS POWER
(Wolfgang Sachs ed., 2007); CRITICAL DEVELOPMENT THEORY: CONTRIBUTIONS TO A NEW
PARADIGM (Ronaldo Munck & Denis O'Hearn eds., 1999).
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opment programs fail to meet-or even result in discernable progress
toward-their goals, the predictable response of international organi-
zations is to initiate another round of the same types of programs. 23
As discussed below, rather than "remedy [ing] past mistakes
and injustices" as Nkrumah requested, 2 4 the programs initiated by the
most powerful states and their leaders have ignored the history of
colonialism, thereby precluding substantive analyses of structural in-
equities. 25 They have reduced the legacy of colonialism to "poverty"
and then proceeded to implement "development" programs that pur-
port to alleviate poverty without risking any fundamental change in
global economic power. This cycle bears all the hallmarks of the stere-
otypical image of alchemy. 26 Rather than questioning the means or the
ends of "development," variants of failed strategies are simply re-
peated, reinforcing the appearance that these are the only viable
alternatives. 27 This essay proposes that the problems associated with
"underdevelopment" cannot be resolved at a global level as long as col-
lective denial of the extent to which colonial relationships persist is the
norm, and until affirmative steps are taken to decolonize international
law and legal institutions. More significantly, perhaps, the repeated
use of strategies known to be ineffective may be the result not of igno-
rance of the outcome, but precisely because such strategies provide the
appearance of concern about inequities while simultaneously ensuring
that the status quo will be maintained.
Part I looks at the role played by the development paradigm in
the decolonization era of the past fifty years, summarizing the types of
programs that have been implemented and highlighting the internal
contradictions generated by a system in which self-determination is
formally mandated yet effectively undermined by economic and politi-
cal constraints placed upon newly independent states. Part II briefly
presents some ways in which this construct of development was used
by colonial administrations to facilitate efficient management and to
23. See infra notes 82-85, 90-97 and accompanying text.
24. See supra note 7 (alteration in original).
25. See infra notes 122-124 and accompanying text.
26. By stereotypical, I refer to common understandings of a process, repeated without
success, whose aim was "the transmutation of the so-called base metals into gold by means
of an ill-defined something called the Philosopher's Stone." STANLEY REDGROVE, ALCHEMY:
ANCIENT AND MODERN 2 (2007 [1922]). For a more nuanced understanding of alchemy, see
generally MARIE-LOUISE VON FRANz, ALCHEMY: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE SYMBOLISM AND
THE PSYCHOLOGY (1980).
27. For a parallel critique of strategies employed by political activists, see generally
Ward Churchill, Dismantling the Politics of Comfort, in SATYA (April 2004); available at
http://www.satyamag.com/apr04/churchill.html.
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justify the imposition of colonial rule. Noting the parallels between the
colonial and post-colonial eras, it is argued that practices perpetuating
colonialism are unlikely to serve the ends of decolonization. The in-
tractability of the development paradigm is considered in Part III,
which begins with an overview of the ideological premises of this
framework, noting that they are integrally related to the fundamental
presumptions of Western civilization and identity. It suggests that
these foundational beliefs will have to be challenged if we are to break
out of the cycles which replicate the dynamics between colonizer and
colonized, or "developed" and "developing" peoples.
II. THE TRANSITION FROM DECOLONIZATION TO DEVELOPMENT
The peoples of the earth ... look to the United States as never before
for good will, strength, and wise leadership. . . . [Wie must embark
on a bold new program for making the benefits of our scientific ad-
vances and industrial progress available for the improvement and
growth of underdeveloped areas. . . . Slowly but surely we are weav-
ing a world fabric of international security and growing prosperity.
President Harry S. Truman,
Inaugural Address, January 20, 194928
Speaking against the backdrop of an intensifying Cold War,
President Harry Truman used his 1949 inaugural address to pledge
that the United States would continue its "unfaltering support" for the
United Nations, maintain programs for "world economic recovery," use
collective security agreements to "strengthen freedom-loving nations
against the dangers of aggression," and make "our scientific advances
and industrial progress available for the improvement and growth of
underdeveloped areas."29 In doing so, Truman inaugurated the "era of
development,"30 centering it on the construct of poverty by emphasiz-
ing that "more than half the people of the world are living in conditions
approaching misery."31 Rather than acknowledging the role that
colonialism may have played in engendering such conditions, Truman
claimed that "[flor the first time in history, humanity possesses the
knowledge and skill to relieve the suffering of these people," thereby
28. President Harry S. Truman, Inaugural Address, (January 20, 1949); available at
http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/presiden/inaug/truman.htm (alteration in original).
29. Id.
30. See Gustavo Esteva, Development, in THE DEVELOPMENT DICTIONARY: A GUIDE TO
KNOWLEDGE AS POWER 6 (Wolfgang Sachs ed., 2007).
31. Truman, supra note 28. On the postwar "discovery" of poverty, see ARTuRO
ESCOBAR, ENCOUNTERING DEVELOPMENT: THE MAKING AND UNMAKING OF THE THIRD WORLD
21-24 (1995); on the subsequent "invention of development," see id., at 24-31.
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casting the problem as one that was natural and inevitable to "under-
developed" areas but capable of being remedied by Western science and
technology. 32
This depiction of both the problem and the solution summarize
the philosophy of modernization and development that has dominated
international relations since World War II.33 In 1948, the World Bank
began quantifying development in strictly monetary terms, equating
per capita income with "underdevelopment" and thus discounting al-
ternative understandings of social wellbeing. 34 This approach was
institutionalized in 1960 when, at President John F. Kennedy's re-
quest, the UN General Assembly announced its first Development
Decade. 35 The program's goal was for each "underdeveloped" country
to achieve at least five percent annual growth in national income, with
the assistance of capital contributions and aid equivalent to about one
percent of the national income of each "developed" country.36 The first
decade's goals were not met, but rather than questioning the project
itself the UN simply gave its three subsequent "development decades"
somewhat less ambitious goals. 37
Since the 1960s, a "right to development" has been recognized
as an emerging norm of international human rights law.3 8 The UN
32. Truman, supra note 28 ("Greater production is the key to prosperity and peace.
And the key to greater production is a wider and more vigorous application of modern
scientific and technical knowledge.").
33. See Gordon & Sylvester, supra note 22, at 9, 16 (noting that "development" has
been construed as modernization plus national economic growth, and that "modernization"
is rooted in the belief that humans can and should control their environment through
reason and science).
34. Id. at 11, 14-15; see also Esteva, supra note 30, at 7. This measure has been
broadened somewhat by the UNDP's "human development index" which, in addition to
income, now incorporates life expectancy, literacy and access to education, as well as
"standard of living" as measured by GDP per capita. See UNDP, Frequently Asked
Questions, available at http://hdr.undp.org/en/statistics/faq/question,68,en.html; see also
Sabina Alkire & Maria Emma Santos, Acute Multidimensional Poverty: A New Index for
Developing Countries, UNDP Human Development Research Paper 2010/11, available at
http://hdr.undp.org/en/reports/global/hdr20lO/papers/HDRP_2010_11.pdf (using an index of
ten related factors, and finding poverty highest in South Asia and Sub-Saharan Mrica).
35. See G.A. Res. 1710 (XVI), UN Doc A/5100 (December 19, 1961); Gordon and
Sylvester, supra note 22, at 30 n.118.
36. G.A. Res. 1710, supra note 35.
37. See International Development Strategy for the Fourth UN Development Decade,
G.A. Res. 199, U.N. Doc. A/RES/45/199 (December 21, 1990); see also Esteva, supra note 30,
at 13-17. Even when the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
(UNESCO) decided that "endogenous development" was more likely to succeed than
externally-imposed development, its approach still presumed that economic growth was the
goal. See Esteva, supra note 30, at 15-16.
38. See generally Noel G. Villaroman, The Right to Developrent: Exploring the Legal
Basis of a Supernorm, 22 FLA. J. INT'L L. 299 (2010).
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Human Rights Council and its predecessor, the Human Rights Com-
mission, have utilized various Working Groups of Experts on the Right
to Development since 1981,39 and a Declaration on the Right to Devel-
opment was adopted by the UN General Assembly in 1986.401
According to the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, it
is a right of all individuals and all peoples "to participate in, contribute
to, and enjoy economic, social, cultural and political development." 4 1
While that description is broad enough to encompass virtually any vi-
sion, the most powerful international institutions and leaders have
continued to perceive "development" in terms of economic growth, fu-
eled by scientific and technological progress and measured by the
reduction of poverty, hunger and disease. 4 2 Echoing themes from Pres-
ident Truman's 1949 inaugural address, President Barack Obama took
office in 2009 promising to "lay a new foundation for growth" in
America by "wield[ing] technology's wonders" and pledging to work
with "the people of poor nations" to "nourish starved bodies and feed
hungry minds."4 3 The perception of some of the leaders of newly inde-
pendent states that recognition of a right to development could serve to
"denounce the old colonial compact" has not materialized. 4 4
A. Inherently Contradictory: Decolonizing Under Colonial Rules
The paradigm that emerged in the postwar decades presumed
development as a universal goal, measuring the "progress" of former
colonies in strictly Western economic terms and relying upon global
economic expansion to address the problems of the dispossessed. 4 5 The
extent to which newly recognized states had been stripped of their
wealth was disregarded, as was the extent to which the Western pow-
ers had relied upon the exploitation of the resources of these territories
39. See UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), The Right to
Development at a Glance, available at http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/RtD/
RTD-at-a-glance.pdf.
40. G.A. Res. 41/128 (1986).
41. UN OHCHR, The Right To Development, supra note 39.
42. See UN Millennium Development Goals, available at http://www.un.org/
millenniumgoals/ (describing the "eight anti-poverty goals" of the 2005-2015 decade);
Margaret Chon, Intellectual Property and the Development Divide, 27 CARDozo L. REV.
2821, 2860 (2006) ("[d]evelopment is often conflated with sheer economic growth").
43. President Barack Obama, Inaugural Address (January 21, 2009); available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/inaugural-address/.
44. See Villaroman, supra note 38, at 299 (quoting a 1967 statement by the foreign
minister of Senegal).
45. See supra notes 34-42 and accompanying text.
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for their own development. 4 6 It was as if the historical slate had been
wiped clean at the moment the former colonies became independent;
they were now simply "backward" or "less developed" states, and the
countries that had become rich and powerful at their expense would
create institutions to "aid" in their development.47
This framing was subject to one important caveat. The histori-
cal record had not been erased with respect to the leases and
concession agreements entered into prior to independence; the former
colonial powers now insisted that these remained binding on the new
states.48 The 1941 Atlantic Charter, proclaimed by President Franklin
Roosevelt and British Prime Minister Winston Churchill, described a
world order in which all states would have equal access "to the trade,
and to the raw materials of the world,"4 9 thereby "characteriz[ing] the
resources of the mandate territories as somehow belonging to human-
ity as a whole."5 0 Former colonies would be recognized as legitimate
states only if they agreed to comply with international law;5 1 a system
that had authorized the appropriation of their resources and now in-
sisted that they comply with agreements entered into by or at the
behest of their former colonial rulers.5 2
Although these territories had not been recognized as sovereign
enough to prevent colonial occupation and expropriation, they were
now deemed to have had just enough sovereignty to have alienated
their natural resources.53 Nationalization of these resources was per-
missible only upon payment of "just" compensation which, in turn, was
determined by standards established at a time when colonized territo-
46. See generally WALTER RODNEY, How EUROPE UNDERDEVELOPED AFRICA (1981);
SAMIR AMIN, IMPERIALISM AND UNEQUAL DEVELOPMENT (1977); SAMIR AMIN, UNEQUAL
DEVELOPMENT: AN ESSAY ON THE SocIAL FORMATIONS OF PERIPHERAL CAPITALISM (1976).
47. See ANGHIE, supra note 3, at 242.
48. Id. at 211-212.
49. Atlantic Charter (1941), text available at http://usinfo.org/docs/democracy/53.htm.
50. ANGHIE, supra note 3, at 212 (alteration in original).
51. See Michael J. Kelly, Pulling at the Threads of Westphalia: 'Involuntary
Sovereignty Waiver' - Revolutionary International Legal Theory or Return to Rule by the
Great Powers? 10 UCLA J. INT'L L. & FOR. AFF. 361, 391 (2005) (Statehood was "bequeathed
on the colonies of the European powers as the preferred incorporation of political self-
realization for colonial peoples. They were, in effect, made in the image of their creators.").
52. See ANGHIE, supra note 3, at 218-220.
53. See id. at 220 ("the essential manifestation of self-determination, the assertion of
sovereignty, becomes primarily a surrender to obligations. [Legal] personality . . . is
invented in order to be bound.") Similarly, American Indians have been deemed sovereign
enough to have lawfully alienated their lands through treaties, but not sovereign enough to
insist that the United States adhere to those treaties. See WARD CHURCHILL, PERVERSIONS
OF JUSTICE: INDIGENOUS PEOPLES AND ANGLOAMERICAN LAw 5-14 (2003).
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ries had no voice in the development of the law.54  As Algerian
President Houari Boumedienne observed, "In the eyes of the vast ma-
jority of humanity it is an (economic) order that is as unjust and as
outdated as the colonial order to which it owes its origin and
substance."5 5
Leaders of the newly independent states recognized that they
had to control their own resources in order to survive and prosper, so
they used their power in the UN General Assembly to contest what
they perceived as predatory legal rules. Thus, the 1960 Resolution
1514 on Decolonization affirmed that "peoples may ... freely dispose of
their natural wealth and resources"5 6 and a 1962 resolution declared
that the "right of peoples and nations to permanent sovereignty over
their natural wealth must be exercised in the interest of their national
development and the well-being of the people . . . concerned."5 7 The
provision for nationalization in the 1962 resolution was ambiguous,
however, providing that "appropriate compensation" was to be paid "in
accordance with the rules in force in the State taking such measures
... and in accordance with international law ,"8 the latter phrase hav-
ing been insisted upon by the United States and Britain.59
By the early 1970s, a number of states associated with the Non-
Aligned Movement were attempting to rectify this contradiction by
launching a New International Economic Order (NIEO).60  Using
their voting power within the General Assembly, the non-aligned
54. See ANGHIE, supra note 3, at 213-216.
55. Quoted in Robert F. Meagher, Introduction to Symposium: The United Nations:
Challenges of Law and Development, 36 HARV. INT'L L.J. 273, 276 (1995).
56. Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples,
G.A. Res. 1514 (XV), UN Doc A/4684 (December 14, 1960). The impact of this Resolution
was limited by its protection of "the national unity and the territorial integrity" of extant
states. Id. Furthermore, at the insistence of the United States and the Soviet Union,
another resolution was passed the following day which protected settler colonial states by
requiring that territories would only be recognized as non-self-governing if they were
"geographically separate" from their colonizers. See Principles which Should Guide
Members in Determining Whether or Not an Obligation Exists to Transmit the Information
Called for under Article 73e of the Charter, G.A. Res. 1541 UN Doc A/4684 (December 15,
1960); see also Ediberto RomAn, Empire Forgotten: The United States' Colonization of
Puerto Rico, 42 VILLANOVA L. REV. 1119, 1138 (1997); Minasse Haile, Legality of Secessions:
The Case of Eritrea, 8 EMoRY INT'L L. REV. 479, 509-511 (1994); Catherine J. Jorns,
Indigenous Peoples and Self Determination: Challenging State Sovereignty, 24 CASE W.
RES. J. INT'L L. 199, 293-295 (1992).
57. Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources, G.A. Res. 1803, UN Doc. A/5217
(December 14, 1962).
58. Id.
59. See ANGHIE, supra note 3, at 217 n.55.
60. See Ruth Gordon, The Dawn of a New, New International Economic Order? 72 LAW
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 131, 142-145 (2009); BENNIS, supra note 11, at 14-16.
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states obtained recognition of the NIEO, a related program of action,
and a Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States.61 Among other
things, the Charter removed reference to international standards of
compensation for the nationalization of foreign property, providing in-
stead that in the absence of other agreement, national law would be
applied. 6 2 The United States and five other states voted against the
Charter, which otherwise received overwhelming support in the Gen-
eral Assembly, particularly from smaller and newly recognized
countries. 63
The world's most economically powerful countries refused to
concede that this attempt to restructure economic relations between
the "developed" and "developing" areas-often termed North and
South-had any binding effect.6 4 The United States and its allies re-
lied upon older principles of international law to argue that developing
countries could not be treated more preferentially than developed ones;
that the NIEO Charter's concept of collective economic security was
without legal basis; and that settled law required full and prompt com-
pensation for foreign property that was nationalized. Further, they
maintained that nonbinding resolutions of the General Assembly could
not change customary law without their consent. 6 5
However, where extant international law tended to benefit the
formerly colonized, Northern states did not hesitate to develop new
rules intended to undermine attempts by recently recognized states to
exercise sovereignty over their natural resources. Traditionally, con-
tracts with private entities had been governed by the laws of the
country in which those companies were doing business. 66 In the mid-
1970s, as disputes arose over oil contracts with Arab states, interna-
tional arbitral tribunals began announcing a "new" international law
of contracts privileging Western notions of private property. This law
essentially gave the private corporations engaged in transnational bus-
iness quasi-sovereign status by declaring that the agreements they had
entered into were not simply contracts subject to the host country's do-
61. G.A. Res. 3201,UN Doc A/RES/3201 (May 1, 1974); G.A. Res. 3202,UN Doc A/9559
(May 1, 1974); G.A. Res. 3281,UN Doc. A/RES/3281 (December 12, 1974).
62. See Burns H. Weston, The Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States and the
Deprivation of Foreign-Owned Wealth, 75 Am. J. INT'L L. 437, 437-439 (1981).
63. Id. at 439.
64. See James Thuo Gathii, Good Governance as a Counter Insurgency Agenda to
Oppositional and Transformative Social Projects in International Law, 5 BUFF. H.R. L. REV.
107, 118-119 (1999).
65. Id.
66. See ANGHIE, supra note 3, at 226-227.
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mestic law but, instead, international agreements subject to an
amalgamation of private contract law and international treaty law.6 7
By the late 1970s, the global economic growth that had been
promised to the "developing" world since the end of World War II had
not materialized and the most powerful states had successfully blocked
any fundamental legal or structural changes that might have nar-
rowed the gap between rich and poor countries. With the debt crisis of
the 1980s, "many Third World governments were now pleading for suf-
ficient funds to stay afloat rather than demanding economic and
political concessions."6 8 Addressing the legacy of colonialism became
the problem of the formerly colonized, and at this point effective con-
trol over development was transferred from UN organs to the financial
institutions conceived in 1944 at the United Nations Monetary and Fi-
nancial Conference held at Bretton Woods, New Hampshire, and
revitalized in the mid-1970s. 69
B. The Influence of International Financial Institutions
The most significant of the Bretton Woods institutions are the
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the International Bank for
Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), also known as the World
Bank. The IMF was established to encourage global economic growth
and trade by stabilizing currency exchange rates and providing short-
term financing.70 The World Bank's initial mandate was to facilitate
economic rebuilding in Europe after World War II by providing capi-
tal,71 but shortly after the war the United States implemented its
Marshall Plan for European reconstruction, leaving the IBRD to focus
67. Id. at 229-234; see also 241-242.
68. Gordon & Sylvester, supra note 22, at 59; see also id. at 37-38 (discussing the
impact of the oil crisis); Gordon, supra note 60, at 145-147.
69. See John W. Head, Law and Policy in International Financial Institutions: The
Changing Role of Law in the IMF and the Multilateral Development Banks, 17 KAN. J. L. &
PUB. POL'Y 194, 195-201; see generally Antony Anghie, Time Present and Time Past:
Globalization, International Financial Institutions, and the Third World, 32 NYU J. INT'L L.
& POLITICS 243 (2000).
70. See Gordon & Sylvester, supra note 22, at 26; Graham Bird, A Suitable Case for
Treatment? Understanding the Ongoing Debate about the IMF, 22 THIRD WORLD
QUARTERLY 823, 825 (2001). See generally, Articles of Agreement of the International
Monetary Fund (July 22, 1944; entered into force December 27, 1945), available at http://
www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/aa/index.htm.
71. See Richard E. Feinberg, The Changing Relationship between the World Bank and
the International Monetary Fund, 42 INT'L ORG. 545, 546-548 (1988); see also Mark E.
Wadrzyk, Is It Appropriate for the World Bank to Promote Democratic Standards in a
Borrower Country? 17 Wis. INT'L L. J. 553, 555-556 (1999).
12 Vol. 6: 1:1
2010 DECOLONIZATION, DEVELOPMENT, AND DENIAL 13
on the "less developed" countries.72 Because the poorest countries
failed to qualify for the IBRD's long-term loans, which carried near-
market interest rates, the International Development Association
(IDA) and various regional development banks were created in 1960 to
provide "soft loans" at lower rates.73
The transfer of development functions from UN organs to the
IMF and the World Bank signaled a significant shift in political as well
as economic power. The United Nations has a stated commitment to
the equality of states, and the General Assembly, with its "one nation,
one vote" policy, is formally structured as a democratic institution.74
Although most states are also members of the IMF and the World
Bank, these entities lack democratic constraints as voting power is de-
termined by each member state's contribution or capital subscription
which, in turn, depends on the country's relative economic strength.75
Further, unlike most treaty-based international institutions, these or-
ganizations preserve the right to interpret their Articles of Agreement
without appeal to any outside court, tribunal, or arbitral process.7 6 Re-
gional development banks are also dominated by their non-borrowing
member countries, raising questions about their ability to reflect re-
gional priorities."7
72. See Head, supra note 69, at 196-197; Rolf H. Weber & Douglas W. Arner, Toward a
New Design for International Financial Regulation, 29 U. PA. J. INT'L L. 391, 394 (2007).
73. See Head, supra note 69, at 196-197. A third proposed Bretton Woods institution,
the International Trade Organization, did not materialize but the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade (GATT) was initiated at Bretton Woods and eventually resulted in the
creation of the World Trade Organization. See Weber & Arner, supra note 72, at 395; see
also World Trade Organization, "The GATT Years: From Havana to Marrakesh," available
at http://www.wto.org/english/thewto-e/whatis-e/fact4_e.htm.
74. See UN Charter, supra note 13, arts. 2(2), 18(1).
75. See Wadrzyk, supra note 71, at 561 (also noting that attempts by the UN General
Assembly to challenge this voting structure were unsuccessful). When the IMF and IBRD
were established, the U.S. controlled about one-third of the voting power in each and,
although this share has dropped to about 17 percent, the United States effectively
maintains veto power over any policy changes. See Ngaire Woods, The United States and
the International Financial Institutions: Power and Influence Within the World Bank and
the IMF, in US HEGEMONY AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 92 (Rosemary Foot, S. Neil
MacFarlane, & Michael Mastaduno eds., 2003). For current statistics on voting strength,
see the IMF and the World Bank Group websites, available at http://www.imf.org; http://
web.worldbank.org.
76. Changes can be made to the Articles of Agreement of either organization only by
agreement of three-fifths of the members, who must collectively control 85 percent of the
voting power. See http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/aalindex.htm; http://siteresources.
worldbank.org/EXTABOUTUS/Resources/ibrd-articlesofagreement.pdf. See also Joseph
Gold, The Interpretation by the International Monetary Fund of Its Articles of Agreement, 3
INT'L & COMP. L. Q. 256, 256-257 (1954).
77. See Enrique R. Carrasco, Wesley Carrington, & HeeJin Lee, Governance and
Accountability: The Regional Development Banks, 27 B.U. INT'L L.J. 1, 59-60 (2009).
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The initial justification for the rigid governance structures of
the world's primary financial institutions was that they were to be in-
volved only in economic, not political, activity. Thus, for example, the
charter of the IBRD, which is almost identical to that of the IDA, pro-
vides that loans are to be granted with "due attention to considerations
of economy and efficiency and without regard to political or other non-
economic influences or considerations," and that the Bank is not to "in-
terfere in the political affairs of any member" nor "be influenced in
their decisions by the political character" of the member(s).78 How-
ever, lending decisions have often been politicized. During the 1960s,
for example, the World Bank invoked the restrictions on political in-
volvement to ignore UN resolutions prohibiting loans to South Africa
and Portugal because of their policies of apartheid and continued
colonialism.7 9 Nonetheless, during this same period, loans were used
strategically to support regimes perceived to be anticommunist. Thus,
Nicaragua received ten loans during the 1950s when its government
worked closely with the U.S. military, while Guatemala, which had a
much larger population, received no loans until its leftist leaders were
replaced.81
IMF and World Bank policies and practices began to overlap as
they focused increasingly on "less developed" countries unable to ob-
tain loans from more conventional sources, and both institutions began
to impose conditions on borrower states which required economic re-
structuring.8 1 In the mid-1970s the IMF began making medium-term
loans to poorer countries, and by the 1980s it was lending almost exclu-
sively to these states. 82 By then the Bank, which had previously
concentrated on project-specific, long-term loans, was also offering me-
dium-term loans conditioned on "structural adjustments" it claimed
would address the underlying causes of the recipient state's economic
problems. 83 These conditions often entailed devastating cutbacks in
government spending and, therefore, in health, education, employment
78. See Wadrzyk, supra note 71, at 559-560 (quoting IBRD Articles of Agreement, arts.
III and IV).
79. Id. at 563.
80. See Gordon & Sylvester, supra note 22, at 24 n.94; see also Daniel D. Bradlow,
Rapidly Changing Functions and Slowly Evolving Structures: The Troubling Case of the
IMF, 94 Am. Soc. INT'L L. PROC. 152, 157 (2000) (noting discrepancies in IMF consideration
of human rights issues in Venezuela, Mexico and Indonesia in the late 1980s and 1990s).
81. See Gordon & Sylvester, supra note 22, at 24-25; see also Namita Wahi, Human
Rights Accountability of the IMF and the World Bank: A Critique of Existing Mechanisms
and Articulation of a Theory of Horizontal Accountability, 12 U.C. DAVIS J. INT'L L. & POL.
331, 338-339 (2006); Feinberg, supra note 71, at 549.
82. See Gordon & Sylvester, supra note 22, at 26-27.
83. See Feinberg, supra note 71, at 549.
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and welfare programs. 8 4 Discussing the problems associated with such
conditionalities, Namita Wahi observes, "The most important right im-
plicated in the measures taken by the World Bank and the IMF is the
right to self-determination which involves the right of all peoples to
freely determine their political status and freely pursue their eco-
nomic, social, and cultural development."8 5
This is the decolonization dilemma in a nutshell. As articulated
in Common Article 1 of the International Covenant on Civil and Politi-
cal Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights, "[a]ll peoples have the right to self-determination," by
virtue of which "they freely determine their political status and freely
pursue their economic, social, and cultural development." 86 Self-deter-
mination is the heart and soul of decolonization; without it,
decolonization is meaningless. The "right to development" has been
framed in terms almost identical to those describing the right to self-
determination, i.e., the right "to participate in, contribute to, and enjoy
economic, social, cultural and political development."87 Nonetheless,
the means of development offered by the international system require
compliance with measures that undermine self-determination. Thus,
the route which purports to lead to meaningful decolonization comes
right back to a relationship in which self-determination (and, therefore
real decolonization) must be subordinated to survival, the primary dif-
ference to direct colonialism being that the conditionalities are
accepted "voluntarily" in exchange for desperately needed loans.88 As
Frantz Fanon put it, "What was wrested by bombardments is recon-
verted into results of free negotiations." 8 9
The loan programs of the international financial institutions
have been no more successful than the "development decades" of the
United Nations in eliminating malnutrition and unemployment or oth-
erwise closing the gap between "developed" and "developing"
84. See Walden Bello, Global Economic Counterrevolution: Northern Economic
Warfare Devastates the South, in 50 Years Is Enough: The Case Against the World Bank
and the International Monetary Fund 14, 18 (Kevin Danaher ed., 1994); see generally,
Margaret Chon, Intellectual Property and the Development Divide, 27 CARDozo L. REV. 2821
(2006).
85. See Wahi, supra note 81, at 350.
86. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), December 16, 1966,
entered into force March 23, 1976, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (1966): 171, art. 1; International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), December 16, 1966, entered
into force January 3, 1976, 993 U.N.T.S. 3 (1966): 3, art. 1 (alteration in original).
87. UN OHCHR, The Right To Development, supra note 39.
88. See Gordon, supra note 60, at 145-151.
89. FRANTz FANON, First Truths on the Colonial Problem, in TOWARD THE AFRICAN
REVOLUTION 120-126, 122 (Haakon Chevalier trans., 1969 [19641).
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countries.9o But the power of these institutions continues to grow. In
fact, the failure of IMF and World Bank policies to achieve their stated
goals has been used to extend their influence more intrusively into all
sectors of society. It is apparently not considered problematic that
"poverty alleviation programs never alleviate poverty or that condition-
alities never achieve their stated goals" because the interventions
"redound to the authority and expansion of international financial
institutions."91
The working definition of "economic considerations" has been
expanded by these lenders to include political and social factors, and
now incorporates assessments of environmental policies, human
rights, and "governance." 9 2 According to former IMF counsel John
Head, "today it is common to find these institutions requiring their
borrowing member countries to accept and adhere to prescribed poli-
cies on environmental protection, indigenous peoples, involuntary
resettlement, governance, corruption, public participation, the role of
women in development, and poverty reduction."9 3 As a result of this
"mission creep," he concludes that the multilateral development banks
"should be regarded as having been transformed from financial institu-
tions into regulatory agencies."94
These regulatory functions are particularly significant because,
by the end of the twentieth century, two-thirds of all states, represent-
ing about half the world's population, were indebted to international
financial institutions. 9 5 Constrained to operating within the political
and economic structures established by the major powers, the hopes
and energies of the national liberation movements of the 1960s were
soon replaced by the realization that "independence" would not be ac-
companied by significant social restructuring or improvements in
economic welfare. Beginning in 1972, international financial institu-
tions dropped some of their more ambitious goals and shifted their
90. See supra notes 14-19, 83-84, 88 and accompanying text. On the failure of
investments based upon bilateral treaty regimes to significantly affect conditions in
"developing" countries, see generally Jeswald W. Salacuse, The Emerging Global Regime for
Investment, 51 HARV. INT'L L.J. 427 (2010).
91. Balakrishnan Rajagopal, From Resistance to Renewal: The Third World, Social
Movements, and the Expansion of International Institutions, 41 HARv. INT'L L.J. 529, 576
(2000).
92. See Wadrzyk, supra note 71, at 554, 562-569; Head, supra note 69, at 198-199.
93. John W. Head, For Richer or for Poorer: Assessing the Criticisms Directed at the
Multilateral Development Banks, 52 U. KAN. L. REV. 241, 252.
94. Id.
95. See ANGHIE, supra note 3, at 247.
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focus to meeting "basic needs."96 Even this proved beyond the capacity
of the structures of development, but it did provide yet another ratio-
nale for intervention in the domestic affairs of the states receiving
Western "aid."97
These interventions were intensified by the reintroduction of
monetarist policies favoring deregulation and the "structural adjust-
ment" programs introduced in the 1980s, with their requirements that
debtor countries eliminate subsidies for local agriculture and indus-
tries, and sacrifice social welfare programs in favor of debt service,
"free markets," and production for export.98 The delinking of the dollar
from the gold standard allowed the economies of the industrialized
North to expand far beyond their productive capacity, but only "debtor"
states were subjected to the rigors of the adjustment programs, 99 a
double standard that did not pass unnoticed in the wake of the Ameri-
can fiscal collapse of 2008.100
C. "Good Governance" and "Failed States"
By the 1990s the World Bank, the IMF, and their regional vari-
ants were framing their development policies in terms of
"democratization" and "good governance," based on the theory that de-
ficiencies in these areas-rather than, say, neocolonialism'"t or
economic exploitation-were the cause of underdevelopment. The fail-
ure of the previous decades' development initiatives to reduce poverty
or improve living conditions did not lead to questioning of the project,
or to structural adjustment of the international economic system itself,
but rather to intensified efforts to "modernize" the global South. 102 As
a result, although these newer states are formally recognized as self-
governing, they can often survive only by surrendering any real sover-
96. See GILBERT RIST, THE HISTORY OF DEVELOPMENT: FROM WESTERN ORIGINS TO
GLOBAL FAITH 162 (Patrick Camiller trans., 1997) (noting that the term "basic needs" was
introduced by World Bank president Robert McNamara).
97. Id. at 164.
98. See Bello, supra note 84, at 14-19; for additional case studies, see generally 50
YEARS Is ENOUGH, supra note 84.
99. See RiST, supra note 96, at 172-173.
100. See Neil MacFarquhar, Upheaval on Wall St. Stirs Anger in the U.N., NY TIMES,
September 24, 2008; see generally Gordon, supra note 60.
101. See Gassama, supra note 2, at 329 (explaining neocolonialism as "the name used to
express the idea that colonial powers appear to engage in the process of relinquishing
control of their colonies even as they were actually evolving new strategies to maintain
colonial influence in the face of popular demand for liberation.")
102. See ANGHIE, supra note 3, at 249 (also noting that the "good governance" standard
is not applied to advanced industrial states); see generally Gathii, supra note 64.
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eignty they might have to the institutions that control their economies
and, often, their political leadership. 103 The alternative, in many
cases, is to be deemed a "failed state," susceptible to political and mili-
tary, as well as financial, intervention. 104
The constraints placed upon decolonization have been political
and social as well as economic. In many instances, the hopes of funda-
mental social transformation attending national independence rested
on the human rights framework articulated in the early postwar pe-
riod. In particular, it seemed that the principle of self-determination
and the economic, cultural and social rights articulated in various UN
declarations and treaties, 105 as well as the UN's consistent condemna-
tion of all forms of racial discrimination, 1 016 would ensure the social
space necessary for implementing the liberatory vision of the
decolonization movements. However, the rights considered essential to
"development" are those civil and political rights sometimes character-
ized as "negative" rights, that is, proscriptions on governmental
intervention rather than prescriptions for social change.0o These are
also framed as rights that can only be exercised by individuals, not by
social movements, communities, or peoples. Both the Universal Decla-
ration of Human Rights108 and the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights 09 - where these rights are most prominently ar-
ticulated-are considered universally applicable but in fact, as legal
scholar Makau Mutua notes, they are "derived from bodies of domestic
jurisprudence developed over several centuries in the West" and re-
present "attempts to universalize civil and political rights accepted or
103. See ANGHIE, supra note 3, at 265 (noting that Third World states' sovereignty is
effectively negated by international influence over their economies); see generally Gathii,
supra note 64.
104. See generally Andrew Coleman and Jackson Maogoto, Democracy's Global Quest: A
Noble Crusade Wrapped in Dirty Reality? 28 SUFFOLK TRANS. L. REV. 175 (2005); Ruth E.
Gordon, Saving Failed States: Sometimes a Neocolonialist Notion, 12 AM. U. J. INT'L L. &
POL'Y 903 (1997); see also Simon Chesterman, Virtual Trusteeship, in THE UN SECURITY
COUNCIL: FROM THE COLD WAR TO THE 21ST CENTURY 219-233 (David M. Malone ed., 2004)
(discussing UN Security Council interventions in "failed states").
105. See supra note 86, infra notes 112-114 and accompanying text.
106. See, e.g., Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 A(III), U.N. Doc. A/
810 at 71 (1948), arts. 1, 2, 7; International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Racial Discrimination, 660 U.N.T.S. 195, entered into force January 4, 1969; ICCPR, supra
note 86, art 2(2); ICESCR, supra note 86, art. 2.
107. See Natsu Taylor Saito, Beyond Civil Rights: Considering 'Third Generation'
International Human Rights Law in the United States, 28 U. MIAMI L. REV. 387, 392-394
(1997).
108. See supra note 106.
109. See supra note 86.
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aspired to in Western democracies.""o This has led many in the global
South and, in particular, many Indigenous peoples to view the contem-
porary human rights regime as a "Trojan horse," to borrow the
phrasing of Gustavo Esteva and Madhu Suri Prakash, designed to im-
pose Western cultural and political values upon their societies, thereby
denying them the opportunity for meaningful exercise of their right to
self-determination. 111
The right of all peoples to self-determination undergirds the
provisions of the UN Charter on non-self-governing territories, 112 and
has been affirmed by the 1960 Declaration on Decolonization,113 com-
mon Article 1 of the 1966 International Covenants on Civil and
Political Rights and on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,1 1 4 and
by subsequent decisions of the International Court of Justice.115 None-
theless it has been narrowly interpreted and effectively limited to
conform to Western understandings of international law and human
rights. Although the number of new states recognized and admitted to
UN membership in the 1960s and 1970s was dramatic, this did not
result in a reformulation of the basic tenets of international law. Only
those states deemed sufficiently "civilized" were acknowledged to be
sovereign, and the legacy of colonialism was reflected further in the
fact that, for the most part, the new states were defined by territorial
boundaries that had been arbitrarily imposed upon them by European
powers."1 1 6 Thus, "the right to self-determination was exercised not by
the victims of colonization but by their victimizers, the elites who con-
trol the international state system."117
Thus, for a variety of reasons, some of which are described
above, the economic and sociopolitical promises of the early years of
110. Makau Wa Mutua, The Ideology of Human Rights, 36 VA. J. INT'L L. 589, 605-606
(1996).
111. GUSTAVO ESTEVA & MADHU SURI PRAKASH, GRASSROOTS POSTMODERNISM:
REMAKING THE SOIL OF CULTURES 117 (1998).
112. UN Charter, supra note 13, arts. 73-91.
113. See supra note 56.
114. See supra note 56; see also B.C. NIRMAL, THE RIGHT TO SELF-DETERMINATION IN
INTERNATIONAL LAw 40-46 (1999).
115. See, e.g., Western Sahara (Advisory Opinion), 1975 I.C.J. 12 (finding that the
people of the Western Sahara had a right to decolonization under Resolution 1514,
notwithstanding the claims of Morocco and Mauritania); Legal Consequences for States of
the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) Notwithstanding
Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), Advisory Opinion, 1971 I.C.J. 16 (finding Namibia's
right to self-determination violated by South African occupation).
116. See Makau Wa Mutua, Why Redraw the Map ofAfrica: A Moral and Legal Inquiry,
16 MICH. J. INT'L L. 1113, 1134 (1995); see generally Tayyab Mahmud, Geography and
International Law: Towards a Postcolonial Mapping, 5 SANTA CLARA J. INT'L L. 525 (2007).
117. Mutua, supra note 116, at 1116.
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decolonization have been constrained by structures in which states are
accorded international recognition only if they conform to extant rules
of international law, and internal societal relations are constrained by
both the narrow range of rights recognized as universal as well as the
constraints placed upon access to global capital and markets.1 18 In Af-
rica, Nkrumah's vision of "developing a continent endowed with so
much wealth"119 has not materialized and other parts of the "develop-
ing" world have not fared much better.
In 1965, Nkrumah lamented that "Africa is a paradox which il-
lustrates and highlights neocolonialism. Her earth is rich, yet the
products that come from above and below her soil continue to enrich,
not Africans predominantly, but groups and individuals who operate to
Africa's impoverishment." 120 More than forty-five years later, it is dif-
ficult to come up with a better description of the plight of a continent
that reflects the inadequacies of the dominant neoliberal economic
model. 1 2 1 As legal scholar Antony Anghie has observed, the jurists of
the postwar era were "framing the project as though the colonial en-
counter was about to occur, as opposed to having already taken
place." 1 2 2 One result has been, to quote Arundhati Roy, that the "en-
trenched system of appropriation has created a situation in which poor
countries which have been plundered by colonizing regimes for centu-
ries are steeped in debt to the very same countries that plundered
them."1 23 Another is that the exploitation resulting from colonialism is
not a subject of redress, but of "aid" or "generosity" on the part of the
richest states. 124
To the extent that the most powerful states have assumed re-
sponsibility for addressing this legacy, it has been almost exclusively
framed in terms of elevating "less developed" peoples to the standards
of the "more developed" states. Will more development, perhaps ac-
companied by better structures of governance, alleviate the problems
faced by formerly colonized peoples? As noted above, neither the five
decades of development programs sponsored by the international com-
munity nor the regulatory regimes implemented by international
financial institutions have been particularly successful. This provides
118. See supra notes 51-52, 56-65 and accompanying text.
119. Nkrumah, supra note 7.
120. Gassama, supra note 2, at 336, quoting KwAME NKRUMAH, NEOCOLONIALISM: THE
LAST STAGE OF IMPERIALISM 1 (1965).
121. See supra note 9, 51-53 and accompanying text.
122. ANGHIE, supra note 3, at 65-66.
123. Quoted in Gassama, supra note 2, at 229 n.8.
124. See, e.g., Raj Bhala, The Limits ofAmerican Generosity, 29 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 299
(2006) (advocating the benefits of "generosity" with respect to trade with Africa).
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empirical evidence that "development" may not be a viable path to true
decolonization and raises the question of whether development, as for-
mulated by these organizations, has subverted the process of
decolonization rather than furthering self-determination. The history
of the construct of development as a tool of colonial administration
helps us understand why this may be a reasonable working hypothesis.
III. DEVELOPMENT AS A COLONIAL CONSTRUCT
As most of us are aware, development rarely seems to "work"-or at
least with the consequences intended or the outcomes predicted.
Why then, if it is so unworkable, does it not only persist but seem
continuously to be expanding its reach and scope? Could it be that
development does in fact work very well?
Jonathan Crush, "Imagining Development," 1995125
The paradigm of decolonization established by the United Na-
tions and strongly supported by the United States has been dedicated
to transforming colonized territories into states that would assimilate
into the international order already consolidated by the colonial pow-
ers, an order privileging territorial integrity over the rights of non-self-
governing peoples. 126 Thus, part of the price of recognition as a new
state was the acceptance of extant legal rules and institutions, as well
as the "civilizing mission" of international law. 127 Nothing in that
framing acknowledged that colonialism might have been wrong, that
the colonizing powers may have been unjustly enriched, or that the
colonized were deserving of legal redress. As a result, the "decoloniza-
tion" process implicitly legitimized the arguments made by colonizing
powers since the fifteenth century that colonialism was for the "good"
of the colonized. 128
The formal equality of states meant no colonizing state owed
anything to its former colonies, for all states were now "equal"; some
125. Jonathan Crush, Imagining Development, in POWER OF DEVELOPMENT 1, 4
(Jonathan Crush ed., 1995).
126. Joel Ngugi, The Decolonization-Modernization Interface and the Plight of
Indigenous Peoples in Post-Colonial Development Discourse in Africa, 20 Wisc. INT'L L.J.
297, 304-305 (2002) (noting that "the concept of 'internal sovereignty' would be employed by
the new states to 'incorporate and assimilate' those whom the classical colonizers had
'forgotten' to 'modernize"').
127. For an overview of this process, see generally James Tully, Modern Constitutional
Democracy and Imperialism, 46 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 461 (2008) (describing the roles that
"civilization," "modernization" and "democratization" have played in maintaining Western
imperialism after formal decolonization).
128. This history is presented in more detail in NATSU TAYLOR SAITO, MEETING THE
ENEMY: AMERICAN EXCEPTIONALISM AND INTERNATIONAL LAW, 37-75 (2010).
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just happened to be richer than others. The problems that might have
been attributed to colonization were now defined as human rights is-
sues and, to the extent these implicated material wellbeing, economic
development programs became the primary remedy. This has re-
mained true, despite the glaring failure of such programs to bring
about the "growing prosperity" forecast by Truman1 2 9 and the many
thoughtful and thorough critiques they have generated.130 This sec-
tion explores the possibility that development programs are incapable
of furthering decolonization because they are deeply rooted in colonial
structures. To illustrate that thesis, it considers the how some aspects
of the postwar development model were utilized by the colonial powers
in the administration of their territories and the implications of that
history.
A. "Guardianship" as a Justification for Colonial Appropriation
International legal scholar and political scientist Quincy Wright
observed in 1930 that well before World War I "nationalism or its ante-
cedent, government by consent of the governed," shifted the rationale
for the possession and administration of colonies "to conform to the
theory of protectorates." 1 3 1 This approach reflects legal justifications
proffered for colonialism since Franciscus de Victoria, who argued in
the early sixteenth century that although Indigenous peoples were ca-
pable of rationality and thus had certain rights, they were "unfit to
found or administer a lawful State up to the standard required by
human and civil claims."1 3 2 As a result, it was argued that it was in
their interest for the Spanish to "undertake the administration of their
country . . . so long as this was clearly for [the Indians'] benefit."1 3 3
According to law professor Robert A. Williams, Jr., Victoria was the
first to articulate a "European discourse of conquest" based upon secu-
lar values:
The material wealth of Western culture . . . could be attained by the
Indians if they simply agreed to accept the West's civilizing religion
and the political and legal hegemony of their self-appointed Euro-
pean guardians. To refuse these benefits indicated delusion and a
129. See supra note 28.
130. See supra note 22.
131. QUINCY WRIGHT, MANDATES UNDER THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS 14 (1968 [19301).
132. ROBERT A. WILLIAMS, JR., THE AMERICAN INDIAN IN WESTERN LEGAL THOUGHT: THE
DiSCOURSES OF CONQUEST 104 (1990) (quoting F. Victoria, De Indis et de Ivre Belli
Reflectiones 160-161 (E. Nys ed., J. Bate trans., 1917)).
133. Id.
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lack of reason, justifying an even sterner, more disciplined exercise
of the Europeans' guardianship ... .134
These presumptions, often reiterated in development discourse
today, were incorporated into the U.S. Supreme Court's legal theories
justifying the appropriation of American Indian lands and resources on
the theory, articulated by Chief Justice John Marshall in Cherokee Na-
tion v. Georgia, that the Indians' "relation to the United States
resembles that of a ward to his guardian."135 The evolution of this
body of U.S. law is significant because of the tremendous influence the
United States has had on the development of international law, 1 3 6 and
because the U.S. continues to use these theories to defend its right as a
settler colonial state to the territories, contiguous and non-contiguous,
over which it claims jurisdiction. 1 3 7
In the early years of the United States, lawmakers were quite
clear, despite their many actions to the contrary, that American Indian
nations were sovereign entities and that treaties made with them fell
squarely within the rubric of international law. As summarized by
Anghie, "the existence of a treaty . . . presupposed a legal universe to
which both parties adhered."138 However, by asserting that Indige-
nous peoples were "domestic, dependent nations"139 whose welfare was
entrusted to the U.S. government, the Marshall Court's trilogy of opin-
ions concerning American Indians broke dramatically with the treaty-
based paradigm and laid the foundation for the U.S. claim to absolute,
plenary power over these nations. 140 This framing was subsequently
134. Id. at 106.
135. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1, 17 (1831). See also ROBERT A. WILLIAMS,
JR., LIKE A LOADED WEAPON: THE REHNQUIST COURT, INDIAN RIGHTS, AND THE LEGAL
HISTORY OF RACISM IN AMERICA 47-70 (2005).
136. See, e.g., Saito, supra note 128, at 182-190 (discussing U.S. influence on postwar
international legal institutions); see generally BENNIS, supra note 11 (detailing U.S.
influence on the UN).
137. On the United States' justifications for its claims to the lands encompassed within
the "lower forty-eight" states, see WILLIAMS, supra note 132, at 227-280; see generally Robert
A. Williams, Jr., The Algebra of Federal Indian Law: The Hard Trial of Decolonizing and
Americanizing the White Man's Indian Jurisprudence, 1986 Wis. L. REV. 219. On the
acquisition and incorporation of Hawai'i, see generally WARD CHURCHILL, Stolen Kingdom:
The Right of Hawai'i to Decolonization, in PERVERSIONS OF JUSTICE, supra note 53, at 303-
403; HAUNANI-KAY TRASK, FROM A NATIVE DAUGHTER: COLONIALISM AND SOVEREIGNTY IN
HAwAI'I (1993); on Alaska, see WALTER NUGENT, HABITS OF EMPIRE: A HISTORY OF AMERICAN
EXPANSION 237-251 (2008). On the status of Puerto Rico as an external colony, see generally
Ediberto Roman, Empire Forgotten: The United States's Colonization of Puerto Rico, 42
VILLANOVA L. REV. 1119 (1997).
138. ANGHIE, supra note 3, at 70.
139. Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. at 17.
140. See generally Johnson and Graham's Lessee u. McIntosh, 21 U.S. 543 (1823)
(invoking the doctrine of discovery to hold that American Indians did not hold land title
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incorporated into the theories of international legal scholars such as
James Lorimer, who noted in 1883 that the "right of undeveloped
races, like the right of undeveloped individuals, is a right not to recog-
nition as what they are not, but to guardianship-that is, to
guidance-in becoming that of which they are capable." 141 In this con-
struction, international law provided "protection" to Indigenous and
colonized peoples, but did not recognize them as state actors.
This perspective dominated the 1884-85 Berlin Conference at
which European colonial powers attempted reach agreement concern-
ing the regulation of their "possessions" in Africa. Africans, of course,
were entirely excluded from the process. 1 4 2 Mutua observes that al-
though numerous African nations had highly advanced civilizations
and had long since been organized in forms that met European criteria
for state recognition, "without much knowledge about the continent,
early European jurists and publicists had decided that much of Africa
was a no-man's land that could be brought under legal occupation." 1 4 3
Taking colonial domination as a given, the "civilized" powers focused
on articulating a more "humanitarian" approach, consistent with Jus-
tice Marshall's formulation, in which treaties with Indigenous peoples
were interpreted not as mutually beneficial and binding legal instru-
ments but rather as justifications for occupation accompanied by
commitments to "protect" the "natives" from undue exploitation. 144
Thus, while the General Act promulgated by the Berlin Confer-
ence participants, including the United States, focused primarily on
the uniform regulation of trade and navigation, it also reflected this
emphasis on "trusteeship."1 4 5 The parties committed themselves "to
watch over the preservation of the native tribes, and to care for the
improvements of the conditions of their moral and material well-being,
capable of being alienated); Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. 1 (holding that the Cherokee Nation
was not a "foreign state" for purposes of federal court jurisdiction); Worcester v. Georgia, 31
U.S. 515 (1832) (finding that federal jurisdiction on Cherokee land preempted state laws).
See also SAITO, supra note 128, at 90-95 (2010) (analyzing these cases); NATSU TAYLOR
SAITO, FROM CHINESE EXCLUSION TO GUANTANAMO BAY: PLENARY POWER AND THE
PREROGATIVE STATE 19-22, 28-31 (2006) (discussing the application of the plenary power
doctrine to American Indian nations).
141. JAMES LORIMER, THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAW OF NATIONS: A TREATISE OF THE
JURAL RELATIONS OF SEPARATE POLITICAL COMMUNITIES 157 (2005 [1883]).
142. See Mutua, supra note 116, at 1127-1129.
143. Id. at 1130; see generally Western Sahara (Advisory Opinion), 1975 I.C.J. 12
(acknowledging that treaties with African nations precluded colonial claims that their lands
could be considered terra nullius), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/index.php?pl=
3&p2=4&k=69&case=61&code=sa&p3=4.
144. See supra notes 131-135 and accompanying text.
145. See General Act of the Berlin Conference on West Africa, February 6, 1885,
reproduced at 3 SUPPL. AM. J. INT'L L. 7 (1909).
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and to help in suppressing slavery," and to develop institutions "which
aim at instructing the natives and bringing home to them the blessings
of civilization." 1 4 6 These goals were also reflected in a subsequent reso-
lution of the Institute of International Law that emphasized "the duty
of colonizing powers to avoid useless severities, to respect native
[rights to] . . . property, to education and [to] improve their moral and
material conditions, to respect liberty of conscience, to prepare for the
abolition of slavery, and to prohibit slave and liquor trade."1 4 7
Wright notes that "humanitarianism was strengthened by a
new appreciation of economic expediency" as the industrialized states
increasingly desired natural resources and markets outside their colo-
nies. 1 4 8 Thus, German Chancellor Otto von Bismarck said of the
Berlin Conference, "all the Governments invited share the wish to
bring the natives of Africa within the pale of civilization by opening up
the interior of the continent to commerce." 1 4 9 This conflation of the
moral and material wellbeing of colonized peoples, and the regulation
of the internal life of their societies that accompanied it, took on in-
creasing significance under the mandate system of the League of
Nations.1 5 0 It also created the template for both the trusteeship sys-
tem of the United Nations15 1 and the regulatory processes of the
international financial institutions established in the wake of World
War II.152
B. Self-Determination and the League of Nations' Mandate System
Even as colonial power was being expanded and consolidated in
Africa and southeast Asia, an emerging right to self-determination was
being acknowledged by the leaders of the world's more powerful states.
Asking Congress to declare war in 1917, U.S. President Woodrow Wil-
son observed: "Self-governed nations do not . . . set the course of
146. See id.
147. See WRIGHT, supra note 131, at 17 n.36a ("Resolution, 1888") (alteration in
original).
148. Id. at 9-10; see also ANGHIE, supra note 3, at 69.
149. Quoted in Makau Wa Mutua, Critical Race Theory and International Law: The
View of an Insider-Outsider, 45 VILLANOVA L. REV. 841, 847 (2000); see also Antony Anghie,
Finding the Peripheries: Sovereignty and Colonialism in Nineteenth-Century International
Law, 40 HARV. INT'L L.J. 1, 64 (1999) (noting that trade became "the mechanism for
advancement and progress").
150. See ANGHIE, supra note 3, at 136 (noting that under the Mandate System,
"international law and institutions were required to create the economic, political and social
conditions under which a sovereign state could come into being").
151. See UN Charter, supra note 13, arts. 75-91.
152. See supra notes 70-84, 90-94 and accompanying text.
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intrigue to bring about some critical posture of affairs which will give
them an opportunity to strike and make conquest. Such designs can be
successfully worked out only under cover and where no one has the
right to ask questions."153 In other words, democratic governance was
the key to a peaceful world, a theme which would be reiterated
throughout the twentieth century. This proposition was expanded
upon in Wilson's 1918 "Fourteen Points" speech to Congress in which
he proclaimed: "What we demand ... is that the world ... be made safe
for every peace-loving nation which, like our own, wishes to live its own
life, determine its own institutions, be assured of justice and fair deal-
ing by the other peoples of the world as against force and selfish
aggression." 15 4 Among other things, the president called for an "abso-
lutely impartial adjustment of all colonial claims, based upon a strict
observance of the principle that in determining all such questions of
sovereignty the interests of the populations concerned must have equal
weight with the equitable claims of the government whose title is to be
determined," and the establishment of a "general association of na-
tions" to ensure "political independence and territorial integrity to
great and small states alike."15 5
By the end of the war the Allies were much indebted to the
United States and, convinced that the League of Nations was the only
hope for implementing his vision of global order, Wilson used all the
powers at his disposal to ensure its establishment. 1 5 6 Wilson's plan
incorporated three key points:
National self-determination, the international equivalent of democ-
racy in domestic politics, would embody the principle of consent of
the governed. Free trade would soften national rivalries and
broaden prosperity. The League was to give security to the whole
system through mutual guarantees of territorial integrity and com-
mon actions against an aggressor.157
Although Wilson's draft of the League Covenant proposed that future
territorial adjustments would be made "pursuant to the principle of
153. President Woodrow Wilson, address to Joint Session of Congress: Request for
Declaration of War (April 2, 1917); Woodrow Wilson Presidential Library, available at http:/
/wwl2.dataformat.com/Document.aspx?doc=29623.
154. President Woodrow Wilson, address to Joint Session of Congress: Address on the
Fourteen Points for Peace (Jan. 8, 1918); Woodrow Wilson Presidential Library, available at
http://wwl2.dataformat.com/Document.aspx?doc=30716.
155. Id.
156. See PAGE SMITH, AMERICA ENTERS THE WORLD: A PEOPLE'S HISTORY OF THE
PROGRESSIVE ERA AND WORLD WAR I, 720-738 (1985).
157. RICHARD HOFSTADTER, THE AMERICAN POLITICAL TRADITION: AND THE MEN WHO
MADE IT 354 (1989 [19481).
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self-determination," this language was dropped and the final version
did not explicitly mention self-determination at all. 15 8 Ultimately,
most of the territorial divisions incorporated into the Treaty of Ver-
sailles were based on secret agreements between the Allies and rarely
involved plebiscites or referenda to consider the desires of the peoples
involved.159
Rather than simply redistributing the colonies of Germany and
the Ottoman Empire in the wake of their defeat in World War I, the
League developed a Mandate System that would serve as a prototype
for decolonization during the twentieth century. Jan Smuts, the
Afrikaaner general and future prime minister of South Africa, initially
proposed this system for the European peoples of the former empires of
Russia, Turkey, and Austria-Hungary, whom he characterized as "in-
capable of or deficient in power of self-government."16 0 Wilson
endorsed the framework proposed by Smuts, but ensured that it was
applied only to the Middle Eastern territories of the Ottoman Turkish
Empire and the colonies held by Germany. 161 Rather than being desig-
nated as mandates, the European territories were incorporated into
existing states through a complex redrawing of borders and a system of
treaties intended to protect national minorities. 162
Article 22 of the League's Covenant began with a formulation
reminiscent of Justice John Marshall's characterization of the United
States as the "guardian" of American Indians: 163
To those colonies and territories which as a consequence of the late
war have ceased to be under the sovereignty of the States which
formerly governed them and which are inhabited by peoples not yet
able to stand by themselves under the strenuous conditions of the
modern world, there should be applied the principle that the well-
being and development of such peoples form a sacred trust of
civilisation. 164
158. See HuRST HANNUM, AuTONOMY, SOVEREIGNTY, AND SELF-DETERMINATION: THE
ACCOMMODATION OF CONFLICTING RIGHTs 32 (1996 [rev'd ed.]).
159. See Hurst Hannum, Rethinking Self-Determination, 34 VA. J. INT'L L. 1, 5-8 (1993);
see also Thomas M. Franck, The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance, 86 Am. J. INT'L
L. 46, 52 (1992).
160. Quoted in ANGHIE, supra note 3, at 119.
161. See WRIGHT, supra note 131, at 24-43.
162. See Nathaniel Berman, 'But the Alternative is Despair'.- European Nationalism and
the Modernist Renewal of International Law, 106 HARv. L. REV. 1792, 1821-1859 (1993); see
generally Nathaniel Berman, A Perilous Ambivalence: Nationalist Desire, Legal Autonomy
and the Limits of the Interwar Framework, 33 HAuv. INT'L L.J. 353 (1992).
163. See Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. at 17.
164. League of Nations Covenant, art. 22. Available at http://fletcher.tufts.edu/multil
www/league-covenant.html#annex.
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This Article then asserted that "the best method of giving practical ef-
fect to this principle is that the tutelage of such peoples should be
entrusted to advanced nations."165
Three classifications of mandate territories were established,
based on their perceived degree of "civilization." The first were the non-
European territories of the Turkish Empire, recognized as having
"reached a stage of development where their existence as independent
nations can be provisionally recognized subject to the rendering of ad-
ministrative advice and assistance by a Mandatory until such time as
they are able to stand alone."166 The second were former German colo-
nies in Central Africa, "at such a stage that the Mandatory must be
responsible for the administration of the territory," subject to certain
guarantees protecting their peoples and securing "equal opportunities
for the trade and commerce of other Members of the League." 167 The
third group, which included South-West Africa and islands in the
South Pacific, were deemed "best administered under the laws of the
Mandatory as integral portions of its territory," again subject to certain
safeguards for their populations. 168
The power to govern the mandates was divided among the Al-
lies, who continued to administer their own colonies as they saw fit.1 6 9
In many ways, therefore, this system functioned simply as a redistri-
bution of colonial possessions, except that under Article 22 the
mandatory powers were responsible to the League. 170 Disputes con-
cerning administration of mandate territories were to be handled by
the League through its Permanent Mandates Commission, and the
peoples of the mandated territories had no direct input into the pro-
cess, other than an ineffectual right to petition the Commission.171
The template for "development" created during the tenure of
the League's Mandate System would have lasting effects on the
decolonization movement and on the contemporary world order in
which purportedly equal and sovereign states must function within
structures that increasingly use measures of "progress" and "develop-
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Id. On these distinctions, see also ANGHIE, supra note 3, at 120-122; SMITH, supra
note 156, at 705-706.
169. See WRIGHT, supra note 131, at 43-48 (detailing the assignments).
170. See League of Nations Covenant, supra note 164, art. 1 (limiting membership to
initial and invited signatories and "any fully self-governing State, Dominion or Colony"
whose admission was agreed to by two-thirds of League members and who provided
additional specified assurances).
171. See Anghie, supra note 3, at 122-123.
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ment" to assess their competency and degree of "civilization." Antony
Anghie, building upon Quincy Wright's detailed exposition of the inter-
nal workings of the Mandate System, explains that at the system was
grounded in an ideological commitment to creating "a progressive, en-
lightened colonialism, as opposed to the bad, exploitative colonialism of
the nineteenth century." 1 7 2 This was used by the Allies to justify the
disparity between establishing mandates for the German and non-Eu-
ropean Ottoman Turkish colonies while maintaining their own African
and Asian empires which, as Anghie put it, "naturally fell into the cate-
gory of 'good colonialism." 173 Thus, for example, in a classic text
published during this period, British colonial administrator Frederick
Lugard, a member of the League's Permanent Mandates Commission,
emphasized the "dual mandate" of the British to bring the benefits of
civilization to African peoples while opening their territories to inter-
national commerce. 1 7 4
What might otherwise have been perceived as tension between
the humanitarian goals of the Mandate System and its commitment to
economic development was reconciled by the presumption that eco-
nomic "advancement" was a prerequisite of civilization. As British
Colonial Secretary Joseph Chamberlain had announced in 1896, "in
our colonial policy, as fast as we acquire new territory and develop it,
[we] develop it as trustees of civilization for the commerce of the
world."1 " 5 Thus the League's Covenant emphasized that "the well-be-
ing and development" of those not adequately prepared to cope with
"the strenuous conditions" of modernity constituted "a sacred trust of
civilization," 176 and explicitly provided that League members were to
"endeavour to secure and maintain fair and human conditions of la-
bour" and to "undertake to secure just treatment of the native
inhabitants of territories under their control."17 7
The wellbeing of the peoples at issue was largely measured by
their economic productivity; this, in turn, required the maintenance of
certain levels of health, hygiene, and education. While the Permanent
Mandates Commission discussed labor conditions extensively, often
measuring them by mortality and morbidity statistics, at least some of
172. Id. at 157.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 252; see generally FREDERICK D. Lugard, The Dual Mandate in British
Tropical Africa (1922).
175. JOSEPH CHAMBERLAIN, British Trade and the Expansion of Empire, in FOREIGN AND
COLONIAL SPEECHES 144 (2009 [1897]) (speech to the Birmingham Chamber of Commerce,
November 13, 1896) (alteration in original).
176. See League of Nations Covenant, supra note 164, art. 22.
177. Id. at art. 23.
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its members believed that certain "races" were simply unsuited to eco-
nomic survival in the modern world.178 Subsistence economies that did
not produce a marketable surplus were by definition "backward," and
reluctance to engage in wage labor or indifference to the accumulation
of wealth were deemed cultural impediments to progress for, according
to the Commission, "the law of labor is a law of nature, which no one
should be allowed to evade."17 9 Traditional forms of governance were
eviscerated and Indigenous leaders rendered impotent under the the-
ory that, "scarcely aware of the fact that their little sovereignty has
been transferred to a higher group, they will assist in the work of the
mandatory government and will be content with the empty title and
the modest stipend."so
Employing what was termed the "science of colonial administra-
tion,"181 every aspect of native society was studied and the Permanent
Mandates Commission utilized complex questionnaires to collect
volumes of data on issues such as governmental structure and func-
tioning, taxation, land use, labor conditions, health care, and
educational facilities. 1 8 2 This information was then used to regulate
all aspects of Indigenous societies. "Progress" was measured by the de-
velopment of infrastructure - roads, railroads, and telegraph
systems-which, in turn, allowed the mandatory powers to penetrate
the interior of the territory and, once there, to transform each society's
economic, political, educational, health, legal, and policing systems. 1 8 3
Underlying this international effort was the premise that even-
tually the mandate territories would be sufficiently "developed" to be
recognized as independent sovereigns, but the entire process of trans-
forming former colonies into self-governing states was so deeply
infused with the ideological presumptions of Western civilization that
the notion of self-determination was stripped of any real meaning. 184
Despite the League of Nations having expanded its community of "civi-
178. See WRIGHT, supra note 131, at 252 (quoting one Commission member's
observation that those races "unable to work" would disappear, while those capable of work
should be required to do so to fulfill the mission of the Mandate System).
179. Quoted in ANGHIE, supra note 3, at 165.
180. Id. at 170 (quoting Minutes of the Third Session of the Permanent Mandates
Commission).
181. See WRIGHT, supra note 131, at 229; see also ANGHIE, supra note 3, at 184-190.
182. See WRIGHT, supra note 131, at 187-188.
183. See Anghie, supra note 3, at 186 (noting the similarities to Michel Foucault's
explanation of how social control may be attained "by defining the normal, the standard and
the truth against which deviations are identified and then remedied").
184. See generally Antony Anghie, Colonialism and the Birth of International
Institutions: Sovereignty, Economy, and the Mandate System of the League of Nations, 34
N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 513 (2002).
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lized" states to include not only European countries and the United
States but also a number of Latin American states and Japan,185 the
prevalent belief was that fundamentally divergent understandings,
worldviews, and value systems were simply impediments to pro-
gress.186 In the positivist international legal framework that emerged
in the nineteenth century, "sovereignty, in the case of non-European
societies, does not arise 'naturally'; rather, it has to be bestowed,"187
and the Mandate System made it clear that it would be bestowed only
when the colonial powers deemed that the purportedly objective and
scientific criteria they had established had been met.188 In other
words, peoples would be recognized as having the capacity to be self-
determining only after abandoning any understandings of their own
histories, cultures, or worldviews that conflicted with Western values,
thereby effectively conceding to the "inevitability" that genuine self-
determination was no longer an option.189
C. The Persistence of the Development Model
The history of "development"-or, in its earlier iterations, "civi-
lization" and "progress"-in the colonial process is significant to
contemporary understandings of the role played by the development
paradigm in decolonization because it illustrates that many of the
mechanisms used to maintain colonial control are being replicated by
international organizations which, today, purport to rectify the dam-
age done to formerly colonized territories. Aim6 C6saire, in his classic
Discourse on Colonialism, quotes Walter Hines Page, U.S. ambassador
to Great Britain, asking Woodrow Wilson in 1914: "'What are we going
to do with this . . . Empire, presently, when economic forces unmistaka-
bly put the leadership of the race in our hands?' . . . 'Aid to the
disinherited countries,' says Truman." In other words, C6saire contin-
ues, "American high finance considers that the time has come to raid
every colony in the world." 190 As with their explicitly colonial prede-
cessors, the agencies of development have failed to provide avenues for
true self-determination and denied colonized and formerly colonized
peoples control over their natural resources. 19 1 Having undermined al-
185. See WRIGHT, supra note 131, at 16.
186. Id. at 558-568.
187. ANGHIE, supra note 3, at 107.
188. See id. at 108.
189. See WRIGHT, supra note 131, at 559, 584.
190. AImE CESAIRE, DISCOURSE ON COLONIALISM 76 (Joan Pinkham trans., 2000 [1950])
(emphasis in original).
191. See supra notes 53-67 and accompanying text.
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ternative means of economic self-sufficiency, access to the capital
necessary to function in the contemporary global economy has been
made contingent on the creation of political and social structures emu-
lating Western models. 1 9 2
Viewed in this light, it should come as no surprise that a half-
century of "development" programs have resulted in the replication of
the relations of economic and political power prevalent in the colonial
era. What is surprising is that the development paradigm persists as
the commonly proffered solution to contemporary problems of global
impoverishment and insecurity. The proposals made by the UN Devel-
opment Programme, 193 or the IMF, 194 or world leaders such as
President Obama, 195 if taken at face value, appear to be advocating the
repetition of an approach which, decade after development decade, and
critiques of development programs abound. 196 In addition, the similari-
ties between contemporary development programs and the methods
used to maintain the economic and political relations between coloniz-
ing powers and their territories are well documented. If these methods
were considered an efficient means of ensuring that non-self governing
territories remained both profitable and politically subservient, why
would they now serve a decolonizing or independence-building
function?
Perhaps contemporary development programs are simply well-
intended exercises in futility, much like the stereotypical experiments
in alchemy. However, those who determine the policies of the world's
most powerful institutions are neither ignorant nor incompetent. It is
at least equally plausible, therefore, that programs which consistently
fail to meet their articulated goals continue to be mandated because
they maintain the status quo very effectively. The states that "devel-
oped" at least in part thanks to colonial exploitation, and that continue
to benefit from neocolonial relations, exercise disproportionate control
over international institutions because of their economic as well as po-
litical power.' 9 7 It is not surprising that the policies they advocate and
implement would replicate existing economic and political
(im)balances rather than fostering true decolonization. The following
section, therefore, explores the possibility of approaching decoloniza-
192. See supra notes 54, 67-68 and accompanying text.
193. See supra notes 14-15, 20-21 and accompanying text.
194. See supra notes 70, 81-82, 93-94 and accompanying text.
195. See supra notes 43 and accompanying text.
196. See, e.g., supra notes 14-19, 22 and accompanying text
197. See Sally Engle Merry, From Law and Colonialisrm to Law and Globalization, 28
LAw & Soc. INQ. 569, 570 (2003).
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tion from a perspective unconstrained by the concurrent model of
development.
IV. REIMAGINING DECOLONIZATION
[Tihe first moment of resistance to imperialism brought forth all the
various nationalist and independence movements that culminated
in the large-scale dismantling of the great classical empires, and the
birth of many new states throughout the world. The second moment
(liberation), however, still continues with us, and its complexities
and turbulence in many instances still defy resolution.
Edward Said, 1990198
In strictly economic terms, the development paradigm has
failed to facilitate the improvements in material conditions of life fore-
seen in conjunction with the end of centuries of colonial rule. The
liberatory potential of decolonization-the restructuring of formerly
colonized societies in ways that would allow peoples to govern them-
selves and to provide for their communities in a manner both
sustainable and culturally consonant-has not been realized.199 If the
ongoing immiseration of so many peoples, the spread of armed conflict,
and environmental devastation are to be avoided, we must think
outside the box of the contemporary world order. In turn, this requires
reconsideration of some of the most basic premises upon which it has
been built. This section returns to the notion of self-determination be-
cause it is central to the decolonization project. It then addresses the
ideological premises of the doctrine of development, premises which co-
incide with those of colonization. Finally, it considers some
possibilities for fundamental change embodied in worldviews that
move beyond the current model in which statehood and development
are equated with decolonization.
A. Revisiting Self-Determination
The decolonization process of the twentieth century was closely
supervised by the colonial powers themselves, and implemented en-
tirely within the framework of international relations they had
developed. In other words, both the analysis of the injustices of coloni-
alism and the means by which they were to be redressed were
198. Edward W. Said, Yeats and Decolonization, 69-95 in TERRY EAGLETON, FREDERIC
JAMESON & EDWARD W. SAID, NATIONALISM, COLONIALISM, AND LITERATURE 83 (1990)
(alteration in original).
199. See supra notes 14-19, 53-55 and accompanying text.
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determined by those who perpetrated the wrongs. 2 0 01 By maintaining
control over the mechanisms for the collective imposition of sanctions
and the use of force, precluding substantive transformation of interna-
tional law without their consent, and consolidating significant power
within economic institutions, the dominant powers ensured not only
that the legacy of colonialism would remain unredressed but also that
colonial relations would be reproduced in various new forms. 201
The most obvious of these forms was, perhaps, the perpetuation
of territorial boundaries arbitrarily imposed upon the colonies. Makau
Mutua observes that the "'Scramble for Africa,' . . . driven by the need
for raw materials and markets for European capitalism, is responsible
for the imposition of the modern state on Africa,"202 and that because
"the European powers treated Africa as terra nullius or no-man's
land,"203 the boundaries they drew on their maps had no relationship
to the cultural, political, or economic realities of the peoples whom they
were quite well aware inhabited the lands at issue. The result, of
course, was a system in which preexisting nations and communities
were both divided between separate colonies and forcibly merged with
other peoples. 2 0 4 Conditioning the right of decolonization on the adop-
tion of colonially imposed state structures and boundaries was
therefore not the granting, or recognition, of a right to self-determina-
tion but a process of "legitimiz [ing] the denial of sovereignty to pre-
colonial, independent African states and communities." 2 0 5
As noted by intellectual historian Edward Said, imperialism:
is an act of geographical violence through which virtually every
space in the world is explored, charted, and finally brought under
control. For the native, the history of his or her colonial servitude is
inaugurated by the loss to an outsider of the local place, whose con-
crete geographical identity must thereafter be searched for and
somehow restored. From what? Not just from foreigners, but also
from a whole other agenda whose purposes and processes are con-
trolled elsewhere. 206
Because history, culture, language and geography were ignored in the
delineation of these territories, legal scholar Tayyab Mahmud explains
200. See supra notes 45-69 and accompanying text.
201. See generally, James Thuo Gathii, Imperialism, Colonialism, and International
Law, 54 BUFF. L. REV. 1013 (2007).
202. Makau Wa Mutua, Putting Humpty Dumpty Back Together Again: The Dilemmas
of the Post-Colonial African State, 21 BROOKLYN J. INT'L L. 505, 518 (1995).
203. See id. at 519.
204. Id. at 518.
205. Mutua, supra note 202, at 523n84 (alteration in original).
206. Said, supra note 198, at 77.
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that "[t]he resulting postcolonial 'contrived state' is often a mockery of
the right of self-determination because territory rather than a distinct
people become the primary frame of reference of the right."2 017 This
process "ensured that internal colonialism became the rule rather than
the exception." 208
Said characterized this process as a "dynamic of dependence" 209
resulting from the reality that "the cultural horizons of nationalism are
fatally limited by the common history of colonizer and colonized as-
sumed by the nationalist movement itself."210 For the peoples of newly
independent states, the price paid for a "self-determination" limited to
nominal political independence was the loss of self-definition: "From
1949 onwards, often without realizing it, more than two billion inhabi-
tants of the planet found themselves changing their name, being
'officially' regarded as they appeared in the eyes of others, called upon
to deepen their Westernization by repudiating their own values."211
Quite predictably, the resulting states "have more often than not failed
to develop into cohesive political units having legitimacy, and have
been plagued by separatist movements, civil wars, and secessions." 212
The extent to which this reality has undermined any hope of
actual peace or security for the world's peoples in the postwar years
was illustrated by cultural geographer Bernard Neitschmann, who em-
phasized the importance of distinguishing states, as political
constructs, from nations, which he defined in terms of peoples with
common history, culture, language, and geographic ties. 213
Neitschmann reported that, as of 1993, there were ninety-seven wars
between states and the nations over which they were attempting to
exercise political control compared to one "state versus state" war and
six "nation versus nation" wars. 214 He also estimated that between
1945 and 1993 over 80 percent of all deaths attributable to genocide
resulted from state-directed genocides against the peoples of na-
tions.215 With governments unable to ensure basic security, many of
207. Tayyab Mahmud, Geography and International Law: Towards a Postcolonial
Mapping, 5 SANTA CLARA J. INT'L L. 525, 545 (2007) (alteration in original).
208. Id.
209. Said, supra note 198, at 75.
210. Id. at 74.
211. RiST, supra note 96, at 258.
212. Mahmud, supra note 207, at 545-546; see also Bernard Neitschmann, The Fourth
World: Nations Versus States, in Reordering the World: Geopolitical Perspectives on the
Twenty-first Century 237 (George J. Demko & William B. Wood eds., 1994).
213. NEITSCHMANN, supra note 212.
214. Id. at 237.
215. Id.
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these countries have been caught in a downward spiral of disintegrat-
ing social networks, dysfunctional distribution systems for food and
other basic necessities, the rise of predatory crime and private security
forces, heightened levels of "ethnic" violence, and a resulting rise in
displaced persons and refugees. 216
It is under such circumstances that the powerful states of the
North describe many of these recently recognized states as "failed," us-
ing that label to justify the re-imposition of some form of colonial
"supervision."217 As law professor Ruth Gordon explains, many West-
ern analysts believe that this is the result of a rush to decolonization (a
view that does not necessarily entail acknowledgment that these
problems are rooted in the process of colonization itself) and propose
some version of international trusteeship as a solution. 2 18 Since the
early 1990s, proposals have been made for international interventions
into states with "governance problems" which would extend and for-
malize the "good governance" requirements of international
development agencies by adapting international law to accommodate
new forms of guardianship over these states. 2 19 This would require a
redefinition of sovereignty and a repudiation of the principles of self-
determination, sovereign equality, and nonintervention fundamental
to contemporary international law.2 2 0 As international legal scholar
Henry Richardson points out, incorporating the construct of "failed
states" into international law in this manner, without addressing the
relationship between failures of governance and economic injustice,
would effectively "re-legalize" colonialism by reinforcing the authority
of Northern states and leading toward "a 'directorate' international
order."221
216. Ruth E. Gordon, Some Legal Problems with Trusteeship, 28 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 301,
306-309 (1995); John H. Sylvester, Essay: Sub-Subharan Africa: Economic Stagnation,
Political Disintegration, and the Specter of Recolonization, 27 Loy. L.A. L. REV 1299, 1306
(1994).
217. For analyses advocating such renewed use of "trust" powers, see generally Saira
Mohamed, From Keeping Peace to Building Peace: A Proposal for a Revitalized United
Nations Trusteeship Council, 105 COL. L. REV. 809 (2005); Brian Deiwert, A New
Trusteeship for World Peace and Security: Can an Old League of Nations Idea be Applied to
a Twenty-First Century Iraq? 14 IND. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 771 (2004). For critiques of this
approach, see generally Gordon, supra note 104; Henry J. Richardson, III, Failed States,
Self-Determination, and Prevention Diplomacy: Colonialist Nostalgia and Democratic
Expectations, 10 TEMP. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 1 (1996).
218. See Gordon, supra note 216, at 308-311; Gordon, supra note 104, at 904-905.
219. Richardson, supra note 217, at 1.
220. See Gordon, supra note 216, at 311-323.
221. Richardson, supra note 217, at 5-7.
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Substantive decolonization will not be accomplished solely in
the realm of law. However, law has always been central to the colonial
enterprise and, therefore, meaningful decolonization will require a fun-
damental restructuring of international law and its attendant
institutions.2 2 2 Law professor B. S. Chimni has observed that interna-
tional lawyers and scholars in India struggled with this issue in their
first "postcolonial" decades, "indict[ing] international law for legitimiz-
ing the subjugation and oppression of Asian peoples," and developing
coalitions to bring about the expansion and restructuring of the legal
system. 223 While acknowledging the numerous contributions of these
efforts, Chimni notes some basic weaknesses that undermined the
movement as a whole. 2 2 4 One was that "the end of colonialism was
equated with the end of international relations based on exploitation
and violence," with a resulting failure "to see that the structures that
had spawned colonialism remained in place." 225 A second weakness
was the adoption of international law's positivist methodology, which
precluded analyses of the historical and political contexts within which
these institutions function. 2 2 6 Finally, these intellectuals accepted and
supported "the post colonial State as standing above conflicts and clas-
ses," with the result that insufficient attention was paid to state
violence, human rights issues, and "the impact of international legal
structures on the lives of ordinary men and women."227
This case study in the decolonization of law illustrates the im-
portance of accepting as foundational the premises that all peoples-
not simply the states purporting to represent them-are the rightful
subjects of international law; that there is a deep and rich history in
which societies of all different types have developed systems to govern
their relations with others; that historical context and political effects
cannot be detached from legal norms or institutions; and that blindly
adopting either the methodological approach or the structures of the
currently hegemonic model will predictably reproduce the relation-
ships upon which it was founded and which it has gone to extreme
222. See generally Daren Z. Zook, Decolonizing Law: Identity Politics, Human Rights,
and The United Nations, 19 HARv. Hum. RTs. J. 95 (2006); Sundhya Pahuja, The
Postcoloniality of International Law, 46 HARv. INT'L L.J. 459 (2005).
223. See B.S. Chimni, Teaching, Research and Promotion of International Law in India:
Past, Present and Future, 5 SINGAPORE J. INT'L & COMP. L. 368, 369-370 (2001) (alteration in
original).
224. Id.
225. Id. at 370.
226. Id. at 370-371.
227. Id. at 372; see also Ugo 1MATTEI & LAURA NADER, PLUNDER: WHEN THE RULE OF LAW
IS ILLEGAL 202-211 (2008).
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measures to maintain. If we take the all peoples premise of the right to
self-determination seriously, we must likewise take it in proper histori-
cal context, understanding that it refers not simply to the aggregate of
individual atomized "units" within the global world order but to peo-
ples, each with their own multilayered identities, cultures, histories,
and worldviews. With this conceptual shift, the claim to universality so
central to the contemporary international legal system and its doctrine
of development begins to crumble.
B. Questioning Fundamental Premises
The international legal order we have inherited is premised
upon a universalized and universalizing worldview in which we share
a common goal of advancing human "civilization ,"228 a paradigm that
undergirds the ideology of colonialism and of development. As put by
law professor David Kennedy, "International law has seen itself as the
voice of civilization, of the center, of the modern, of the future, and of
universal humanism and progress against, or in dialog with, the voices
of the non-Christian world, the primitive, underdeveloped, non-West-
ern, outlaw world of those who do not yet see things from a high
place." 2 2 9
In this euroderivative framing, the civilized are juxtaposed to
the savage who are depicted as part of nature. "Opposed to cultivation,
which is civilized, is savagery, which isn't. And what is savage (silves-
tris, silva) is literally 'of the woods.' . . . Our languages thus encode the
forms of fear and contempt felt by a settled agricultural community for
other modes of material and social organization."2 3 01 In this worldview
civilization and human-ness are measured by distance from nature
and thus defined by what they are not. Legal philosopher Peter Fitz-
patrick explains that when identity is thus created through negation,
an "uncivilized" Other must always exist to confirm the existence of the
civilized. 2 3 1
Once it is presumed that people are defined by their distinction
from nature, it follows that progress or development is rightfully mea-
228. For a more detailed explication, see SAITO, supra note 128, at 19-30.
229. David Kennedy, When Renewal Repeats: Thinking Against the Box, 32 NYU J.
INT'L L. & POLITICS 335, 359 (2000); see generally David Kennedy, Primitive Legal
Scholarship, 27 HAuv. INT'L L.J. 1 (1986).
230. RICHARD WAswo, THE FOUNDING LEGEND OF WESTERN CIVILIZATION: FROM VIRGIL
TO VIETNAM 6 (1997); see also FRANCIS JENNINGS, THE INVASION OF AMERICA: INDIANS,
COLONIALISM, AND THE CANT OF CONQUEST 74 (2010 [1975]) (noting that until the late 1500s
the term "savage" was used to refer to plant, animal and (uncivilized) human life).
231. PETER FITZPATRICK, THE MYTHOLOGY OF MODERN LAw 38 (1992).
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sured by the extent to which humans have brought nature under their
control. Rationality and language, both posited as distinctly human
attributes, are credited with allowing human conquest of the earth
through scientific and technological advances. 2 3 2 In this worldview,
science gave humanity an accelerating ability to convert natural sub-
stances such as coal and oil, and even atomic particles, into "fuels"
whose energy was harnessed to industry. Industrialization propelled
the growth of markets, ever more "efficient" modes of transportation,
and urbanization. 2 3 3 Kenyan legal scholar Bosire Maragia explains
that thus, in the Western paradigm,
Science became the social context for producing the knowledge es-
sential to the development of technology which in turn drove
industrial production that came to be identified with social pro-
gress. The ideas of progress, civilization, and development required
privileging science and technology as well as the systematic obliter-
ation of all types of knowledge that were identified with primitive,
uncivilized, and, today, underdeveloped societies.234
If one accepts a universally applicable definition of human pro-
gress as leading to higher forms of civilization measured, in large part,
by material or scientific development, one then has "objective" and "ra-
tional" means by which to judge a society or culture's relative degree of
civilization. 235 By this measure, Western civilization represents the
highest stage yet attained in human history. This conclusion is often
reached by comparing the relative material wellbeing of people in "civi-
lized" and "uncivilized"-or "developed" and "developing"-states. In
addition, Darwinian notions of evolution are often invoked to portray
the Western powers' conquest of huge portions of the planet as evi-
dence of their superiority. J. M. Roberts provides a typical example of
this formulation in his History of the World:
By 1900 European civilization had shown itself to be the most suc-
cessful which had ever existed. Men might not always agree on
what was most important about it but no one could deny that it had
produced wealth on an unprecedented scale and that it dominated
the rest of the globe by power and influence as no previous civiliza-
232. See, e.g., J.M. ROBERTS, HISTORY OF THE WORLD 29 (1993) ("The irrationalities of
this [twentieth] century show the narrow limits of Man's capacity for conscious control of his
destiny. To this extent, he is still determined, still unfree, still a part of nature.")
233. See id. at 565-573; WASWO, supra note 230, at 186-187.
234. Bosire Maragia, The Indigenous Sustainability Paradox and the Quest for
Sustainability in Post-Colonial Societies: Is Indigenous Knowledge All That Is Needed? 18
GEORGETOWN INT'L ENv. L. REV. 197, 217-218 (2006).
235. See generally Teodor Shanin, The Idea of Progress in THE POST-DEVELOPMENT
READER 65-71 (Majid Rahnema & Victoria Bawtree eds., 1997).
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tion had ever done. Europeans (or their descendants) ran the
world.236
Within this framing, those who resist incorporation into this history
may simply be "backward" and in need of enlightenment. Those who
refuse to assimilate despite having been given the opportunity, and
who persist in opposing the spread of Western civilization, are unlikely
to survive.2 3 7
Because Western identity relies so heavily on the negation of
the Other and is so embedded in a universalizing history of the "rise" of
humanity from a state of nature, an uncivilized-or at least insuffi-
ciently civilized-Other is a necessary component of this identity.
Anghie uses the phrase "dynamic of difference" to refer to an "endless
process of creating a gap between two cultures, demarcating one as
'universal' and civilized and the other as 'particular' and uncivilized,
and seeking to bridge the gap by developing techniques to normalize
the aberrant society."2 3 8 This understanding of the "Other" is rooted in
the work of Edward Said, who explained the Orient as "the place of
Europe's greatest and richest and oldest colonies, the source of its civi-
lizations and languages, its cultural contestant, and one of its deepest
and most recurring images of the Other," a construct that "has helped
to define Europe (or the West) as its contrasting image, idea, personal-
ity, and experience." 2 3 9
Just as particular individuals and cultures must posit an "un-
civilized" Other in order to self-identify as "civilized," the existence of a
colonial center, or metropole, requires a periphery. By definition, the
"center" can no longer be central if the entire periphery is absorbed and
incorporated into it. One way to move beyond the center-periphery di-
chotomy which lies at the heart of colonialism is to acknowledge and
empower a multiplicity of interrelated and perhaps overlapping reali-
ties and sources of power, none of which exert control over the others.
This possibility is recognized, at least potentially, in the contemporary
236. Roberts, supra note 232, at 555. See also ERIC R. WOLF, Europe and the People
Without History 5 (1982) (discussing the "genealogy" of the West).
237. See, e.g., Wright, supra note 131, at 252. (quoting the observation of a member of
the League's Permanent Mandate Commission that those races "unable to work" would
disappear, while those capable of working should be required to do so in order to fulfill the
mission of the mandate).
238. ANGHIE, supra note 3, at 4. Peter Fitzpatrick extends the concept to his analysis of
the development of Western law, noting that it "is imbued with this negative transcendence
in its own myth of origin where it is imperiously set against certain 'others' who concentrate
the qualities it opposes." Fitzpatrick, supra note 231, at 10.
239. EDWARD W. SAID, ORIENTALISM 1-2 (1979).
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notion of self-determination, which, as legal scholar Hurst Hannum re-
minds us, is in "constant evolution."2 4 0
Hannum chronicles this evolution from the Wilsonian position,
which gave "lip service" to national aspirations but included no mean-
ingful right to be free from external domination, to the decolonization
phase in which the right of non-self-governing territories to indepen-
dence was recognized, to a third and contemporary stage in which
international law purports to guarantee more extensive human rights
but "generally exclud[es] a right to independent statehood."241 He con-
cludes that "the norm of self-determination in the post-colonial era is
both a shield that protects a state (in most cases) from secession and a
spear that pierces the governmental veil of sovereignty behind which
undemocratic or discriminatory regimes attempt to hide."2 4 2
As this summary illustrates, even in the process of decoloniza-
tion, states have continued to be presumed the primary "actors" of
international law, and national liberation equated with statehood.
However, if the liberatory potential of self-determination is to be real-
ized, the sanctity of extant state formations as well as the construct of
statehood itself will need to be interrogated. European states them-
selves were the product of colonization and conquest, and they used
their self-reflective descriptions of what it meant to be a "civilized
state" to justify the imposition of colonial regimes upon other parts of
the world. 2 4 3 The distinctions they drew between those deemed savage
or barbarian and those recognized as civilized were critical underpin-
nings of the international legal order they constructed-one that
conditioned rights on state recognition, rationalized conquest with the
doctrine of "discovery," and used the "higher purpose" of spreading civi-
lization to justify what were otherwise unconscionable policies. 2 4 4
240. Hannum, supra note 159, at 66.
241. Id. at 67 (alteration in original).
242. Id. at 68; see also Robert D. Sloane, Policies of State Succession: Harmonizing Self
Determination and Global Order in the Twenty-First Century 30 FORDHAM L. REV. 1288,
1306 (noting "the prevailing view, that the modern right to self-determination must, with
few exceptions, be exercised within a framework that respects the territorial integrity of
sovereign States"); see also In re Secession of Quebec, 3 I.L.M. 1340 (1998).
243. See Mahmud, supra note 207, at 534; Wolf, supra note 236, at 101-125; see
generally, ROBERT BARTLETT, THE MAKING OF EUROPE: CONQUEST, COLONIZATION AND
CULTURAL CHANGE 950 - 1350 (1994)
244. See Mahmud, supra note 207, at 541-543; see also SAITO, supra note 128, at 35-53.
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C. Envisioning Options
Colonization and its contemporary variants continue to be con-
tested. Although "decolonization" has come to be equated with formal
independence, it is important to note the distinction made by Edward
Said between two intertwined political moments, the "period of nation-
alist anti-imperialism" and the "era of liberationist anti-imperial
resistance that often followed it."245 Noting that the struggles against
domination continue in formerly colonized regions of the world, Said
suggests "that liberation, and not nationalist independence, is the new
alternative, liberation which by its very nature involves, in Fanon's
words, a transformation of social consciousness. . . ."246 Independent
statehood, the goal of nationalist anti-imperialism, has not resulted in
fulfillment of the vision reflected in Patrice Lumumba's speech upon
the granting of independence to the Congo. 2 4 7 Realization of the liber-
atory potential of decolonization requires us to re-envision the
premises upon which the current international order-and its doctrine
of development-are based, and to restructure international institu-
tions in accordance with this transformed social consciousness.
What might this involve? Gustav Esteva and Madhu Suri
Prakash note that "our grassroots experiences continue to teach us
that we do not live in a universe, but in a pluriverse; that the univer-
sality in the human condition claimed by human rights propagators
exists only in their minority worldview."2 4 8 If we view our surround-
ings as a pluriverse rather than the universe, we can begin to
deconstruct the institutions whose purpose is the "globalization" of all
humanity, thereby opening up the space, both literal and conceptual,
for a multiplicity of adaptive systems of social organization. In what
has been termed the Fourth World of Indigenous nations there are nu-
merous societies where people are presumed to be an integral part of a
nonhierarchical natural world, with a nonlinear history.249 In various
forms, most of these cultures have an understanding of human purpose
that relates to a responsibility to the earth, rather than a right or
245. Said, supra note 198, at 83.
246. Id.
247. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
248. ESTEVA & PRAKASH, supra note 111, at 125; see also id. at 27 ("the subject is always
historical and specific: he or she cannot be abstracted out of the relation, adopting some
divine view from 'nowhere"').
249. See generally Ward Churchill, I Am Indigenist: Notes on the Ideology of the Fourth
World, in ACTS OF REBELLION: THE WARD CHURCHILL READER 275-299 (2003); GEORGE
MANUEL & MICHAEL POSLUNS, THE FOURTH WORLD: AN INDIAN REALITY (1974).
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destiny to tame the savage wilderness.25() From such perspectives, jus-
tice may be perceived as the antithesis of what we in the West
associate with law. According to social philosopher Robert Vachon,
among many traditional indigenous cultures "it is difficult to under-
stand that rights or entitlements could be homocentrically defined by a
human being. That they, furthermore, could be defined by a sovereign
state ... is almost ridiculous."2 5 1
Acknowledging this diversity of perspectives means rejecting a
universalizing, hierarchical notion of human identity and purpose, be-
ing willing to entertain the possibility that the human "good" may not
be dependent on scientific or technological advances-or "develop-
ment"-and being open to truly diverse understandings of peoples,
histories, and worldviews. Global institutions could use the need for
changes in international law illustrated by the problems of those states
described as "failed" or "failing" as an opportunity to acknowledge that
the problems of colonialism have not been adequately addressed by the
contemporary international legal system and its programs for develop-
ment. In turn, this acknowledgment could serve as the basis for
structural changes that help decolonize law rather than reinforcing the
disparities of wealth and power that it currently serves to protect. 2 5 2
Richardson points out that instead of accepting "the implicit no-
tion among some elites that self-determination is an illicit claim whose
proponents are best suppressed in the name of international public or-
der,"2 5 3 we could find in the construct "a duty, specified to those
countries of the world community having the sufficient resources, of
establishing international transparent process in a declared 'failed'
state designed to eliminate, in the short term, all pockets of abject pov-
erty. . .. [And] to support irreversible, locally empowering development
process to ensure such poverty would never return."2 5 4 Or, as Gordon
has advocated, we could turn the usual presumption of the colonial
Other "on its head and assume that people are quite capable of gov-
erning themselves." 2 5 5 She observes that international law currently
250. See VINE DELORIA, JR., GOD IS RED: A NATIVE VIEW OF RELIGION 78-97 (2d ed. 1992
[1973]).
251. ESTEVA & PRAKASH, supra note 111, at 110 (quoting Robert Vachon, L'etude du
Pluralism Juridique: Une Approche Diatopique et Dialogale, J. LEG. PLURALISM &
UNOFFICIAL L. 163,65 (1990)).
252. See Richardson, supra note 217, at 7 (linking "failed states" to "the perennial
dilemma of a state-centric international legal system" of protecting rights within states
whose resources are inadequate to the task).
253. Id.
254. Id. at 8 (alteration in original).
255. Gordon, supra note 104, at 971.
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"focuses on institutions and the privileges and powers of states; the
silence of the peoples of these communities, in transforming interna-
tional law, is deafening."2 5 6  Resisting such silencing, Xanana
Gusmdo, the first president of an independent East Timor, stated:
We are not interested in a legacy of cars and laws, nor are we inter-
ested in a legacy of development plans for Timorese . . . . We are not
interested in inheriting an economic rationale which leaves out the
social and political complexity of East Timorese reality. Nor do we
wish to inherit the heavy decision-making and project implementa-
tion mechanisms in which the role of the East Timorese is to give
their consent as observers rather than the active players we should
start to be. 257
If international legal norms and institutions are to be recon-
structed in a truly liberatory fashion there must be room for all voices
and perspectives, and the creation of this space requires stepping back
from the fundamental premise that the purpose of international law is
to articulate and enforce one universal worldview. 2 5 8 In light of the
history referenced in this essay, as well as the willingness of many con-
temporary legal scholars to acknowledge that the Westphalian system
has outlived its political utility, it seems reasonable to consider solu-
tions that would empower the peoples and nations upon which state
structures have been imposed, rather than limiting our "post-statist"
options to the framework of economic globalization created by the most
powerful states. 2 5 9
It seems evident that a diversity of perspectives cannot be
meaningfully incorporated through the "one size fits all" development
or democratization programs currently advocated by international in-
stitutions as the only available means of redress for the legacies of
colonialism.2 6 0 As Esteva notes in his critique of UNESCO's support
for "endogenous development," "if the impulse is truly endogenous,
that is, if the initiatives really come out of the diverse cultures and
256. Id.
257. Quoted in Joel C. Beauvais, Benevolent Despotism: A Critique of U.S. State-
Building in East Timor, 33 NYU J. INT'L L. & POL. 1101, 1101-1102 (2001).
258. The potential of incorporating non-Western understandings into international law
is reflected in the growing appreciation of Indigenous approaches to environmental
problems. See, e.g., Russel Lawrence Barsh, The Challenge of Indigenous Self-
Determination, 26 U. MICH. L.J. REFORM. 277, 278-279 (1993).
259. For an analysis equating the current world order to a globalized imperial state, see
generally B. S. Chimni, International Institutions Today: An Imperial Global State in the
Making, 15 EUR. J. INT'L L. 1 (2004).
260. For other possible models, see, e.g., M. Cherif Bassiouni, International Recognition
of Victims' Rights, 6 HuM. RTs. L. REV. 203, 247-250 (2006) (discussing basic principles of
law applicable to reparations for gross violations of human rights law).
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their different systems of values, nothing would lead us to believe that
from these would necessarily arise development-no matter how it is
defined-or even an impulse leading in that direction."2 6 1 Arturo Esco-
bar similarly emphasizes that development economics is but one
"construction of the world," not "the objective universal science its
practitioners assumed it was."2 6 2 He notes, however, that in addition
to "mak[ing] explicit the existence of a plurality of models," it is neces-
sary to understand "the mechanisms by which local cultural knowledge
and economic resources are appropriated by larger forces . . . and, con-
versely, the ways in which local innovations and gains can be
preserved as part of local economic and cultural power."263
Deconstructing development theory, Swiss development theo-
rist Gilbert Rist points out that it would be hypocritical to criticize the
Western bias inherent to a universalizing belief in development "if one
were then to claim that one's own conclusions were universal. . . . But
this in no way justifies the injustices of the present day, when some
continue to 'develop' while others have to make do with a 'happy pov-
erty' - on the false grounds that this corresponds to their particular
culture."264 In an analysis that can be usefully adapted to the
problems discussed in this essay, Rist makes three suggestions in-
tended to help "prepare the ground for post-development-which
should not be confused with 'anti-development," cautioning that "[t]o
want to do something different from what has been done so far does not
mean doing the opposite." 265 First, he advocates taking an approach to
growth that recognizes the importance of all peoples' material condi-
tions of life but "consciously addresses international inequalities as
well as environmental devastation" rather than being restricted to free
trade principles. 2 6 6 Rist then proposes reinforcing alternatives devel-
oped by "social movements in the South which have stopped expecting
everything to come from the good will of those in power, and no longer
believe either in aid or in international co-operation," 267 i.e., removing
the constraints that prevent subordinated communities from becoming
self-reliant or reviving their own value systems. Finally, he empha-
sizes the need to challenge ideas considered self-evident in ordinary
261. Esteva, supra note 30, at 15-16; see also supra note 37.
262. ESCOBAR, supra note 31, at 94.
263. Id. at 98 (alteration in original).
264. RisT, supra note 96, at 241.
265. Id. at 247 (alteration in original).
266. Id. at 248 (summarizing this approach as "manag[ing] without illusions a system
that is known to be perverse"); see also id. at 242.
267. Id. at 243; see also id. at 248 (describing this as "a wager on the positive aspects of
exclusion").
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discourse and to construct non-hegemonic explanatory models that in-
corporate a wide range of historic and cultural realities. 2 6 8 Each of
these suggestions provides a useful starting point for constructing of a
model of decolonization that moves beyond the narrow parameters of
development theory.
V. CONCLUSION
I hear the storm. They talk to me about progress, about "achieve-
ments," diseases cured, improved standards of living.
I am talking about societies drained of their essence, cultures tram-
pled underfoot, institutions undermined, lands confiscated,
religions smashed, magnificent artistic creations destroyed, ex-
traordinary possibilities wiped out.
Aimd Cisaire, Discourse on Colonialism, 1955269
This essay began by invoking the hopes of the early years of
decolonization, and noting the contrast between those visions of libera-
tion and the disappointments of contemporary realities. Part I briefly
summarized the history of decolonization in international law, and the
proffering of "development" as the international community's solution
to the problems faced by the people of newly independent states. In
light of the persistent failures of that model, Part II suggested that the
premises of the development model are virtually identical to those un-
dergirding colonialism, and observed that they were utilized,
apparently quite effectively, to maintain colonial administrations.
Considering this history, it seems not only reasonable but very predict-
able that the relationship of domination and subordination inherent to
colonial structures would be replicated with respect to "developed" and
"developing" states. Distinguishing statehood from aspirations to lib-
eration, Part III considered some alternative approaches through
which, collectively, we may be able to extricate ourselves from the spi-
ral of inequality and sociopolitical unrest in which we find ourselves
today.
One remaining thought should be addressed. If we are to take
seriously the notion that we inhabit a pluriverse-rather than the uni-
verse-of peoples, communities, and worldviews, we will also be forced
to recognize that the legacies of colonialism cannot be framed only in
terms of the "problems" of the formerly colonized and what needs to be
changed with respect to their communities. In The Colonizer and the
Colonized, Tunisian sociologist Albert Memmi systematically explains
268. Id. at 247.
269. CESAIRE, supra note 190, at 42-43.
46 Vol. 6: 1: 1
2010 DECOLONIZATION, DEVELOPMENT, AND DENIAL
how anyone who finds him or herself party to a colonial relationship is
inevitably defined by it.270 There can be no neutral parties, no "good"
colonizers. 271 Elimination of the colonial relationship, then, requires
transformation on both sides. The colonized cannot be liberated if the
colonizers, or those benefit from colonialism, remain unchanged. The
metropole cannot exist, as such, without the periphery.
Similarly, as long as there are "developed" states, there will be
the "developing," "less developed," or permanently "underdeveloped"
states. If we are serious about eliminating these distinctions, the fun-
damental transformations of social consciousness referenced by Fanon
and Said will have to occur not only among the formerly-and perhaps
still-colonized, but among those who have benefitted from, and con-
tinue to benefit from, the legacy of colonialism. This, in turn, means
being willing to accept fundamental changes to the status quo. While
this may be a discomfiting prospect, it seems likely that, as Rist ob-
serves, the "greatest danger we face is a refusal to face reality, be it out
of conformity or fear."2 7 2 The current state of global affairs, with its
widespread immiseration, armed conflicts, and environmental disas-
ters, is clearly not sustainable. Having seen that neither collective
denial nor the repetition of failed "development" programs will change
this reality, it appears that creative alternatives are in order.
270. ALBERT MEMMI, The Colonizer and the Colonized ix (Howard Greenfeld trans.,
1965) (noting that the colonial relationship "chained the colonizer and the colonized into an
implacable dependence, molded their respective characters and dictated their conduct").
271. See Jean-Paul Sartre, Introduction, in id. at xxv.
272. RisT, supra note 96, at 258.
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